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Criminal Law and Procedure:
A Two-Year Survey
by James P. Fleissner*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the two-year survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals and
the Georgia Supreme Court issued well over a thousand published
opinions addressing issues of criminal law and procedure.' The primary
purpose of this Article is to summarize judicial decisions constituting
noteworthy developments in the law. Given the scope of survey, the
constraint of limited space imposed difficult choices concerning what to
include. As in past years, this survey will focus on highlights, such as
cases of first impression and cases presenting close or controversial
issues. The Author hopes this Article will provide useful information for
busy practitioners seeking to keep abreast of developments in Georgia
criminal law and procedure. Beyond providing summaries of the cases,
it is the further hope of the Author that the accompanying analysis and
commentary will contribute to the public discourse on these important
legal issues.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
Marquette University (B.A., 1979); University of Chicago (J.D., 1986). Member, State Bar
of Illinois.
The Author wishes to state that it was with some trepidation that he accepted the
invitation of the Georgia Survey editors to prepare this Article. My apprehensiveness
resulted from being a newcomer to Georgia and was compounded by following several
years' authorship by a distinguished member of the Georgia bench. The Author hopes the
Article will be of some small service to those involved in the criminal justice system of the
state despite the Author's recent introduction to Georgia criminal law. The Author also
expresses his appreciation to C. Todd Ross, an outstanding member of the Mercer Law
School Class of 1997, who provided diligent and able research assistance.
1. The Author selected cases for the survey by reviewing cases from 264 Ga. 255, 443
S.E.2d 619 (June 6, 1994) through 266 Ga. 849, 471 S.E.2d 507 (June 17, 1996) and from
213 Ga. App. 520,444 S.E.2d 875 (June 9, 1994) through 221 Ga. App. 768,472 S.E.2d 435
(May 9, 1996).
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Of course, the body of two years' worth of criminal appellate decisions
on myriad issues of law defies a general characterization. However, it
is possible for a particular issue to stand out from the rest and assume
a status of prominence as a "defining issue" of the period. During the
survey period, several factors combined to push one issue confronting the
Georgia criminal justice system to the forefront: the vexing problem of
racial and socio-economic bias, both real and perceived.
The litigation that culminated with the Supreme Court of Georgia's
opinion in Stephens v. State2 was illustrative of the difficulty inherent
in the race issue and the sharp divisions to which the issue gives rise.
Stephens involved allegations that prosecutors had applied the Georgia
statute requiring mandatory life imprisonment for two-time drug
offenders disproportionately against African-American defendants.' The
Stephens saga involved a bitter and complex legal debate, allegations of
racism and the hard feelings such charges engender, fears of paralyzing
the criminal justice system with endless litigation, and concerns over
hindering the fight against crime. As will be discussed below, the
Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged there was an apparent problem,
but declined to impose a judicial solution. The court's decision shifted
the debate to the halls of the legislature where something remarkable
happened: Despite political trends towards ever-tougher penalties for
drug crimes, the legislature eliminated the mandatory life term for twotime drug offenders, thereby defusing the explosive issue raised in
Stephens. The controversy represented the most prominent legal debate
of the survey period. The ultimate outcome of the controversy represented a meaningful step towards reducing the perception of racial unfairness in the Georgia criminal justice system.
Here is how Stephens unfolded: Defendant was an African-American
convicted in Hall County for selling cocaine.4 Defendant was eligible to
be sentenced under the provision that required life imprisonment upon
conviction for a second drug offense,' and the prosecution opted to seek
2. 265 Ga. 356, 456 S.E.2d 560 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 144 (1995).
3. 265 Ga. at 357, 456 S.E.2d at 564.
4. Id. at 356, 456 S.E.2d at 560.
5. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d) (1982). The statute, now repealed, provided in pertinent part:
(b) Except as authorized by this article, it is unlawful for any person to
manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, administer, sell, or possess with intent
to distribute any controlled substance ....
(d) Except as otherwise provided, any person who violates subsection (b) of this
Code section with respect to a controlled substance in Schedule I or a narcotic
drug in Schedule II shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than 30 years.
Upon conviction of a second or subsequent offense, he shall be imprisoned for life.
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), (d) (1982).
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a life sentence under the mandatory life sentence provision.6 Citing
statistics that suggested that the application of the mandatory life
sentence law was racially skewed against African-Americans, defendant
challenged the use of the law in his case as a violation of the equal
protection guarantees of the United States and Georgia Constitutions.'
On March 30, 1995, a sharply divided Supreme Court of Georgia
denied defendant's challenge, holding that the statistics presented by
defendant were insufficient to establish an equal protection violation in
his case.8 The four-justice majority also refused to hold that defendant's
statistics established a sufficiently strong inference of discriminatory
application of the mandatory life sentence provision so that the
prosecution should be required to present the sentencing court with
assurances
that the provision was applied to defendant for race-neutral
9
reasons.
Two of the three dissenting justices joined in a strident response to the
majority." The dissent characterized defendant's statistical evidence
of discrimination as "numbing and paralyzing" and urged that the proper
course would be to establish a procedure requiring prosecutors to
respond to such a showing by coming forward with proof that the
selection of the defendant for sentencing under the mandatory life
sentence law was based on permissible race-neutral reasons."
The closeness of the outcome can be seen in the special concurrence of
Justice Thompson, who cast the deciding fourth vote.' Of defendant's
statewide statistical data regarding racial application of the mandatory
life sentence law, Justice Thompson stated that "only a true cynic can
look at these statistics and not be impressed that something is amiss." 3
Further, Justice Thompson was open to the dissenters' view that the
court might require the prosecutor to provide a justification for a
decision to apply the law in some circumstances. 4 Justice Thompson's
vote, however, was premised on his conclusion that defendant's
statistical evidence was insufficient to show discrimination in the critical
jurisdiction, Hall County, where defendant was prosecuted. 5 Justice
Thompson's concurrence, which included an overt request that the

6. Stephens, 265 Ga. at 356, 456 S.E.2d at 561.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 356-57, 456 S.E.2d at 560-61.
Id. at 356, 456 S.E.2d at 561.
Id. at 358-59, 456 S.E.2d at 562-63.
Id. at 372, 456 S.E.2d at 566-71.
Id. at 364-67, 456 S.E.2d at 566-67.
Id. at 361-65, 456 S.E.2d at 564-67.
Id. at 362, 456 S.E.2d at 564.
Id., 456 S.E.2d at 565.
Id.
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General Assembly consider amending the mandatory life sentence
law,1 6 clearly leaves one with the sense that the outcome of this racially
charged case could have been different.
What added to the public controversy over the ultimate decision in
Stephens is that the outcome had been different. Thirteen days before
the issuance of the final opinion in Stephens, the supreme court had
issued a slip opinion in the case with a different result. 7 In that
opinion, Justice Thompson provided the decisive vote for a majority that
found the statistics presented by the defense "numbing and paralyzing"
and "so grossly disproportionate to prosecution percentages as to shock
the conscience.""8 In what the short-lived majority termed a "watershed case," the March 17, 1995 opinion held that the United States and
Georgia constitutional guarantees of equal protection require a
prosecutor, in light of the statistical proof of discriminatory application
of the mandatory life sentence law, to provide a race-neutral explanation
for the decision to apply it to defendant Stephens. 9 The three justices
who were soon to join Justice Thompson in the majority dissented in the
initial decision in Stephens.2" Following angry and public protests,
mainly from prosecutors, 2 ' the Supreme Court took the unusual step
of reconsidering and reversing its prior decision.2
Needless to say, the controversy surrounding Stephens galvanized
opinion on both sides of the public debate and helped to bring the issue
of discrimination in the criminal justice system to the forefront. The
decision in Stephens took place while another significant event was
occurring: The Georgia Supreme Court Commission on Racial and
Ethnic Bias in the Court System was finishing its work. The Commission, established by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1993 to study the
issue of bias, issued its final report in August 1995, several months
ahead of schedule.2" Upon the release of the report, Commission cochairman and court of appeals Judge Jack Ruffin said, "[1]et the word go

16. Id. at 363, 456 S.E.2d at 565.
17. Stephens v. State, No. 594A1854, 1995 WL 116292 (Ga. March 17, 1995) (vacated
upon reconsideration),
18. Id. at 1-2.
19. Id. at 8, 10.
20. Id. (four-page dissent following majority opinion).
21. See Emily Heller, Racial Test Put to the Test, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., March
30, 1995, at 1 (noting motion for reconsideration filed by the Attorney General and all 46
district attorneys).
22. Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 356, 456 S.E.2d 560 (1995).
23.

LET JUSTICE BE DONE: EQUALLY, FAIRLY, AND IMPARTIALLY, GEORGIA SUPREME

COURT COMMISSION ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURT SYSTEM (August 1995). See

id. at 229 (Appendix A) (Supreme Court Order creating the Commission and requiring
completion of report by January 1996).
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If the Commission's report was admirable, the effort to repeal the
mandatory life term for two-time offenders was heroic. The legislation,
which reportedly was the result of negotiations between prosecutors and
the defense bar,14 became law on July 1, 1996."5 The amended law
provides that a second or subsequent drug felony may be punished by a
sentence of ten to forty years or life imprisonment, at the discretion of
the court."6 Despite the acrimony of the controversy and risks of being
perceived as being soft on crime, prosecutors and legislators, with the
urging of the Supreme Court, reached common ground with the defense
bar on this reform. In this case, the common ground was also the high
ground.

II. SUBSTANTIVE
A.

CRIMES AND RELATED ISSUES

ConstitutionalChallenges

Race. This survey begins with a close
Equal Protection:
of
the
legal
issues in Stephens. Freddie Stephens, an
examination
African-American, was convicted of selling cocaine in the Hall County
Superior Court." The prosecution exercised its discretion to request
that Stephens be sentenced under O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30(d), which
required imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life upon
conviction of a second narcotics felony.3 Stephens contended that the
mandatory life term provision was applied to him in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the equal protection guarantees of the

34. Trisha Renaud, DAs, Defenders Joined on Drug Bill, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
March 22, 1996, at 1. ("A quiet alliance of prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys has
succeeded in changing one of Georgia's most controversial sentencing laws, one requiring
life sentences for second-offense drug dealers.").
35. Ga. H.R. Bill 1555, Reg. Sess. (1996) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d), (f)). The
amended statute provides in pertinent part:
(b) Except as authorized by this article, it is unlawful for any person to
manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, administer, sell, or possess with intent
to distribute any controlled substance ....
(d) Except as otherwise provided, any person who violates subsection (b) of this
Code section with respect to a controlled substance in Schedule I or Schedule II
shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than 30 years. Upon
conviction of a second or subsequent offense, he or she shall be imprisoned for not
less than ten years nor more than 40 years or life imprisonment.
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), (d) (1996).
36. Id.
37. Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 356, 456 S.E.2d 560 (1995).
38. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d).
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forth that racism is not allowed a captaincy on the ship of justice."2 4
Of course, this statement denies that racism is in command of the vessel,
but allows that it is aboard. The Commission's final report, while
praising the fairness of most persons involved in the criminal justice
system, forthrightly acknowledged the role of racial and class bias.2"
Although the Commission found open and intentional bias only in
isolated instances, it "concluded from all the evidence it considered that
there are still areas within the state where members of minorities,
whether racial or ethnic, do not receive equal treatment from the legal
system."26 More frequent than intentional acts of discrimination, the
Commission noted, "there are incidences of bias which appear to result
from unintentional conduct resulting from a lack of awareness."2 7
The Commission also concluded "that the system is biased against
economically disadvantaged individuals."8 The Commission further
noted that socio-economic bias "more seriously affects minorities since
they compose a greater portion of the economically and educationally
disadvantaged."29 The Commission also found that the criminal justice
system in Georgia "parallels the national picture" of disproportionately
high numbers of minorities involved in the system as arrestees,
defendants, and inmates."° And the problem of perceptions is even
greater: The Commission's research showed that minorities (and
women) "see a totally different justice system than non-minority
males."3132 Not surprisingly, negative perceptions of the system breed
distrust.

The Commission's final report, which is an admirable effort at a
reflective self-study by the justice system, clearly serves to make the
issue of race and class bias a pre-eminent concern of the survey period.
The ongoing national debate over issues of race and class in the criminal
justice system engendered by the O.J. Simpson trial underscores the
importance, and timeliness, of the Commission's work. Significantly, the
Commission's final report contains many constructive proposals for
addressing the current state of affairs.38

24.
1995,
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Bill Rankin, CourtsClearedof Racism, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Sept. 27,
at C1.
LET JUSTICE BE DONE, supra note 23, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 41-45, 130-32.
Id. at 13-37 (Summary of Recommendations).
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United States and Georgia Constitutions. 9 In support of his claim of
discrimination, Stephens cited these statistics, which the trial court
accepted:
* In Hall County, 14 of 14 (100%) of the persons serving life
sentences under O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30(d) were African-American,
although African-Americans made up less than 10% of the county's
population and about 57% of the persons arrested in drug investigations.'
* 369 of 375 (98.4%) of the persons serving life sentences for drug
offenses in Georgia (as of May 1, 1994) were African-American,
although African-Americans make up only 27% of the State's
population.41
* 1 of 168 (under 1%) of the whites sentenced for 2 or more narcotics
convictions was serving a life sentence, compared to 202 of 1219
(16.6%) of the blacks.42
The ultimate decision in Stephens, issued on March 30, 1995, rejected
defendant's equal protection claims. 43 The four votes to reject Stephens's claims were cast by two justices concurring in the opinion of
Justice Fletcher and by Justice Thompson, who concurred in the
judgment and filed a special concurring opinion." Three justices
dissented, with Justice Benham filing a dissenting opinion. 4 All the
justices seemed to agree that for Stephens to convince the court to
preclude application of the mandatory life sentence to his case, he would
have to show intentional racial discrimination in his case.' Stephens
conceded that he did not have direct evidence of discriminatory intent
against him.4' All the justices also appeared to believe that the
statistics, by themselves, presented by Stephens were insufficient to
conclusively establish that the prosecution had the forbidden discriminatory intent."

39.

265 Ga. at 356, 456 S.E.2d at 560.

Stephens also argued that the sentencing

statute violated due process and equal protection because the sentencing scheme was
irrational. Id. at 359, 456 S.E. 2d at 563. The supreme court's rejection of this claim was
not a major point of contention between the justices. Id.
40. Id. at 356-57, 456 S.E.2d at 561.
41. Id. at 357, 456 S.E.2d at 561.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 356-60, 456 S.E.2d at 561-63.
44. Id. at 361, 456 S.E.2d at 564.
45. Id. at 364, 456 S.E.2d at 566.
46. Id. at 357-58, 361, 365, 456 S.E.2d at 561-62, 564, 566 (noting that intentional
discrimination must be shown).
47. Id. at 357, 456 S.E.2d at 561-62.
48. Id. at 357-58, 456 S.E.2d at 562.
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The principal issues in Stephens were: Where a defendant produces
statistical evidence establishing a prima facie case of discrimination,
should the court interpret the equal protection guarantees of the United
States and Georgia Constitutions to require the prosecution to come
forward with assurances that a defendant was selected for the mandatory life term on a race neutral basis? If so, did the statistical evidence
presented by Stephens constitute a sufficient prima facie showing to
trigger such a required assurance by the state?
The dissenters in Stephens answered both of these questions in the
affirmative.49 The dissenters argued for a middle course between
finding an equal protection violation and total rejection of defendant's
claim. The principal legal authority for this middle course was the
Supreme Court's approach to statistical proof of discrimination in the
use of peremptory challenges during jury selection as outlined in Batson
v. Kentucky." Under Batson, a party may allege that the opposing
party is exercising peremptory challenges in a pattern that gives rise to
a discriminatory purpose. 5' If such a prima facie showing is made,
then the burden shifts to the party exercising the peremptory challenge
to demonstrate that the challenge was based on permissible racially
neutral selection criteria.5 2 Using the Batson model, the dissenters
contended that where a defendant can establish, through statistical
evidence, a prima facie showing that the decision to seek the mandatory
life sentence may have been racially motivated, the court should require
the prosecution to show that the defendant's selection for the aggravated
sentence was based on race-neutral criteria." As for the adequacy of
Stephens's statistical showing, the dissenters found the numbers
presented to be "numbing and paralyzing" and to constitute a "stark
pattern," and thereby sufficient to shift the burden to the state.54 Thus,
the dissenters concluded that Stephens "was entitled by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to have the prosecution make raceneutral explanation for its application of the aggravated sentencing
procedure."5 In the alternative, the dissent stated that even if federal
constitutional law did not require the result, that the 5Batson-style
6
procedure should be required under the state constitution.

49. Id. at 365, 369-70, 56 S.E.2d at 567, 569.
50. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
51. Id. at 93.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 94.
Stephens, 265 Ga. at 369, 456 S.E. 2d at 569.
Id. at 364, 369, 456 S.E.2d at 566, 569.
Id. at 369-70, 456 S.E.2d at 569 (bracketed material omitted).
Id. at 370, 456 S.E.2d at 569-70.
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The three justices joining in the opinion of the court emphasized that
statistical evidence of discrimination had often been rejected as
inadequate to prove the presence of improper racial motives in individual cases.57 Justice Fletcher's opinion portrays the Supreme Court's
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp' as the key source of authority for
rejecting Stephens's claim, as well as several Georgia decisions subsequent to McCleskey."9
In McCleskey, the Supreme Court considered an equal protection claim
based on a statistical study purporting to show that the application of
the death penalty in Georgia was racially skewed, with more frequent
application to cases involving white victims and black defendants.'
The Supreme Court held that the statistics were insufficient to meet
defendant's burden of establishing the existence of purposeful discrimination in his case."1 In rejecting defendant's claim, the Supreme Court
emphasized that discretionary judgments are an inherent part of a
criminal justice system: "Because discretion is essential to the criminal
justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we
would infer that the discretion has been abused."6 2 The Supreme Court
also rejected a middle course, advanced by Justice Blackmun's dissent," that would have accepted defendant's statistics as establishing
a prima facie case and shifted the burden to the prosecution to provide
race-neutral reasons for the exercise of discretion.'
The Batson
approach was rejected as impractical: It is simple to require a prosecutor to provide an explanation in response to a contemporaneous
challenge to the prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge during
jury selection, but judicial inquiries into the prosecutor's exercise of
charging discretion in a given case, which would often involve a review
of past conduct by prosecutors, would be cumbersome."
McCleskey provided a strong legal precedent supporting the outcome
in Stephens. The opinion of the court found the statistics presented by
Stephens insufficient to establish discrimination in his case, and noted

57. Id. at 357, 456 S.E.2d at 561.
58. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
59. Stephens, 265 Ga. at 357, 456 S.E.2d at 561. See Cain v. State, 262 Ga. 598, 422
S.E.2d 535 (1992); Hall v. State, 262 Ga. 596, 422 S.E.2d 533 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
1055 (1993); Hailey v. State, 263 Ga. 210, 429 S.E.2d 917 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1048 (1994),
60. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87.
61. Id. at 297.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 351-65. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 296-97.
65. Id. at 296.
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The opinion
the absence of any direct proof of discrimination.6
discounted the value of state-wide statistics because of their limited
value in assessing the motives of individual prosecutors.67 McCleskey
also lent support to the Stephens decision's rejection of the Batson model
because of the serious practical problems associated with conducting
hearings into prosecution decisions." Thus, the opinion of the court in
Stephens was well grounded in precedent as to the federal equal.
protection claim.
Regarding Stephens's parallel state equal protection claim, the opinion
of the court concluded that Stephens's statistical evidence was insufficient, and noted that there was no evidence on the critical issue of the
race of persons eligible for the mandatory life sentence in Hall County,
but against whom the prosecutor chose not to seek the mandatory
sentence.6 9 While dispensing with the state constitutional claim in a
manner similar to the federal claim, the opinion left the door open just
a crack: "Without more adequate information about what is happening
both statewide and in Hall County, we defer deciding whether statistical
evidence alone can ever be sufficient to prove an allegation of discriminatory intent in sentencing under the Georgia Constitution."7 ° However,
one of the three Justices joining the lead opinion in Stephens wrote a
concurring opinion stating the view that the Georgia Constitution should
not be interpreted more broadly than the federal constitution on the
equal protection issue presented by the case.71
With three justices adhering to McCleskey and three justices favoring
the Batson model (if only as a matter of state constitutional law), the
special concurrence of Justice Thompson may provide the crucial clues
about the future of statistically based equal protection challenges to
prosecution decisions. Justice Thompson began by acknowledging the
troubling statistics presented by Stephens concerning the application of
the mandatory life sentence provision, stating that."only a true cynic can
look at these statistics and not be impressed that something is amiss." 2
Justice Thompson's next point was good news to prosecutors worried
about the implications of equal protection claims in death penalty cases.
Justice Thompson stated his belief that the court should continue to
adhere to McCleskey in death penalty cases, where the prosecutor's

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Stephens, 265 Ga. at 357-58, 456 S.E.2d at 561-62.
Id. at 358-59, 456 S.E.2d at 562-63.
Id. at 359, 456 S.E.2d at 562.
Id. at 358, 456 S.E.2d at 562.
Id.

71. Id. at 360-61, 456 S.E.2d at 563-64.
72. Id. at 362, 456 S.E.2d at 564.
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discretion to seek the death penalty is checked by the jury's decision
whether to impose that penalty.73
However, Justice Thompson suggested a different approach for
evaluating prosecutorial discretion under the law allowing a mandatory
life sentence for two-time drug offenders, which became automatic once
the prosecutor opted for it and obtained a conviction.74 Justice
Thompson stated that he was persuaded that Batson "could be used to
supply a general framework in analyzing cases of this kind," although
he qualified this by saying it "will need more careful study."75 A
definitive decision about use of the Batson model was unnecessary for
Justice Thompson because he found Stephens' statistical showing
inadequate to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination under
Batson.7" Of particular concern was the lack of statistics concerning
the racial makeup of the group of eligible defendants in Hall County who
were not chosen for enhanced sentences.7 7 Thus Justice Thompson,
who had signed on to the majority opinion in the first Stephens opinion
requiring a Batson-style inquiry, changed his position based on a reevaluation of the statistical evidence. His special concurrence left open
the possibility that the court would adopt the Batson model upon a more
complete statistical account of prosecutions under the mandatory life
sentence law, but tended to close off the possibility of a similar approach
in death penalty cases.
The ultimate outcome of the Stephens case was that the supreme court
declined to require scrutiny of the decision to seek the mandatory life
sentence for Stephens.7" It was left open whether another defendant
might succeed by marshalling more complete statistics. But Justice
Thompson made it clear that he believed the legislature should step in

73. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 564-65.
74. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 565.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 363, 456 S.E.2d at 565.
77. Id.
78. The United States Supreme Court recently reached a similar result on a similar
issue. In United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), the court addressed the issue
of what showing a defendant must make to be entitled to discovery to support a claim of
racial discrimination in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Citing separation of powers

concerns and a reluctance to burden the prosecution, the court adopted a rigorous standard,
holding that discovery would not be ordered unless the defendant produces evidence that

similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not. Id.
at 1487-88. The Supreme Court rejected the Batson model, contrasting the supervision of
jury selection, where "the entire res gestae take place in front of the trial judge," and
scrutiny of prosecution charging decisions, which would involve scrutiny of many other
prosecutions. Id. at 1488.
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and address the situation, making further judicial intervention
unnecessary.79 In his view, because prosecutors sought life sentences
under O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30(d) for only fifteen percent of eligible
offenders, the mandatory life sentence provision already had "been
repealed de facto."'0 Among the alternative courses of action for the
legislature, Justice Thompson appeared to favor the modification of the
law to allow judges the discretion of imposing sentences less than life
imprisonment for two-time drug offenders. 8
Subsequent to the decision in Stephens, the prospect of a successful
equal protection challenge based on Batson improved because of newly
published data. The Final Report of the Georgia Supreme Court
Commission on Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Court System published
statewide data comparing the race of defendants eligible for the
mandatory life term for two-time drug offenders.82 Those figures show
that 0.5% of eligible white defendants received life sentences, while 5.7%
of eligible black defendants were chosen for the mandatory life term."
While the Commission report recommended a detailed, circuit by circuit
study of the law's use, the report concluded that the currently available
statistics "obviously demonstrate that the outcome of these drug offense
cases differ significantly along racial lines."8 '
Of course, the new data, with the promise of more to come, added to
the momentum for legislative action to curb prosecutorial discretion in
applying the mandatory life provision. But there were political realities
in the way: Giving the sentencing judge discretion, as suggested by
Justice Thompson, 8 might be perceived as being "soft on crime." On
the other hand, no one advocated eliminating prosecutorial discretion by
requiring the life term for all eligible defendants.86 That would have
been "tough on crime" in a way that would have exceeded the preferences of prosecutors, who sought the mandatory life sentence for only 5% of
eligible defendants.8 7 Obviously, the best course was to shift discretion
from the prosecutors to the courts, even if the action was wrongly
perceived as "soft on crime." Naturally, the easy course for the
legislature would have been to preserve the status quo. Ultimately, the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

265 Ga. at 363-64, 456 S.E.2d at 565-66.
Id. at 363, 456 S.E.2d at 565.
Id. at 363-64, 456 S.E.2d at 565-66.
LET JUSTICE BE DoNE, supra note 23, at 164-65.
Id. at 164.

84. Id. at 165.
85. Stephens, 265 Ga. at 363-64, 456 S.E.2d at 565-66 (Thompson, J., specially
concurring).

86. Id. at 363, 456 S.E.2d at 565; LET JUSTICE BE DONE, supra note 23, at 166.
87. LET JUSTICE BE DONE, supra note 23, at 164.
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legislature, supported by the defense bar and prosecutors, made the
enlightened and politically courageous choice of abandoning the
mandatory life term." The new law gives judges discretion to impose
appropriate sentences on repeat drug offenders, including the option of
life imprisonment. The damage to crime control will be negligible; the
benefit to the perception of racial fairness will be substantial.8 9

Equal Protection: Gender. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected
an equal protection challenge to the state's statutory rape lawg' in In
the Interest of B.L.S., a child.9 Appellant was found to be delinquent
because he committed statutory rape.9 2 Appellant argued that he was
subject to being found delinquent for having intercourse with an under-

age female, while there is no corresponding sanction for females.9 3 The
court found no equal protection problem because a female engaging in

sexual intercourse with a male under age fourteen may be found in

violation of the child molestation statute. 94 Even though the delinquency proceeding against a female would concern the violation of the child
molestation statute, the court reasoned that she would be subject to the
same penalties and the same delinquency adjudication as a male who
commits statutory rape. 95
Justice Sears dissented from the majority's analysis. She wrote that
"in its present form, Georgia's statutory rape law is blatantly discrimina-

88. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d).
89. The new law is not retroactive, so the over 300 defendants serving sentences under
the old law are not affected. Those defendants may raise legal claims or seek relief from
the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. See Renaud, supra note 34, at 3.
90. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3 (1996). The statute provides as follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of statutory rape when he engages in sexual
intercourse with any female under the age of 14 years and not his spouse,
provided that no conviction shall be had for this offense on the unsupported
testimony of the female.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of statutory rape shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
Id.
91. 264 Ga. 643, 449 S.E.2d 823 (1994).
92. Id. at 643, 449 S.E.2d at 823.
93. Id.
94. Id. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) provides as follows:
A person commits the offense of child molestation when he or she does any
immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age
of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the
child or the person.
O.C.GA. § 16-6-4(a) (1996).
95. 264 Ga. at 643-44, 449 S.E.2d at 823-24.
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tory and manifestly unfair and is, therefore, unconstitutional."9 As for
the court's equal protection reasoning, Justice Sears took issue with the
contention that the punishments for statutory rape and child molestation
are equal. In fact, the child molestation statute' provides lenient
sentencing options for first offenders not available under the statutory
rape statute." Justice Sears concluded that equal protection required
that the statutory rape statute be gender neutralized to include female
perpetrators." Justice Sears went further, stating that the statutory
rape law violates due process by, in effect, establishing an irrebuttable
presumption that females in their age groups were incapable of
consenting to sex."° This presumption, the justice wrote, simply does
not comport with reality. 1 ' Perhaps to encourage the legislature,
Justice Sears pointed out that during the last decade, over forty states
have reworked their statutory rape laws, with many eliminating genderbased classifications and excluding relations among young peers from
the proscribed conduct.0 2
Privacy: Criminalizing Sodomy. In 1986, the United States
Supreme Court found that Georgia's criminal proscription against
consensual sodomy did not violate the due process rights conferred by
the federal constitution.0 3 In that ruling, the Supreme Court declined
to find a fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in consensual
sodomy and refused to insulate sodomy between consenting adults from
state proscription.'
In 1996, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether the Georgia sodomy statute0 5 infringes on the
privacy rights conferred by the Georgia Constitution."e The defendant

96. Id. at 645, 449 S.E.2d at 824.
97. O.C.GA. § 16-6-4(b).
98. Id. § 16-6-3(b).
99. 264 Ga. at 646, 449 S.E.2d at 825.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 647, 449 S.E.2d at 826.
102. Id. at 648, 449 S.E.2d at 826.
103. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
104. Id. at 191-92.
105. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a) (1996). The statute provides as follows:
A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another. A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy when he or she
commits sodomy with force and against the will of the other person. The fact that
the person allegedly sodomized is the spouse of a defendant shall not be a defense
to a charge of aggravated sodomy.
Id.
106. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property except by due process of law." See also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
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in Christensen v. State'°7 was convicted of solicitation of sodomy0'
Defendant was caught by a police sting operation; he was arrested after
he asked a male undercover officer to engage in oral sex. 0 9 Defendant
argued that the solicitation statute and the sodomy statute violated his
privacy rights under the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution."1 ° The court rejected this claim and upheld the statutes. The
court noted that the state has a right to exercise its police power "to
promote the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of its citizens.""' The court concluded: "We hold that the proscription against
sodomy is a legitimate and valid exercise of state police power in
furtherance of the moral welfare of the public."" 2 The court stated
is to be changed, it will have to be changed by the
that if the law
3
legislature.11

Two justices dissented. Justice Sears, noting the long history of
expansive interpretation of Georgia's right of privacy, chided the
majority in heated language:
Unfortunately, today the majority eviscerates the rights of privacy and
free speech by applying the wrong constitutional standards to them,
and by ignoring relevant precedent from this Court. For these reasons,
I believe that the result of the majority opinion is pathetic and
disgraceful, and has tragic4implications for the constitutional rights of
the citizens of this State.1
Justice Sears pointed out that defendant and the undercover officer had
agreed to proceed to the privacy of a motel room and that there was
never any hint that money would be exchanged." 5 In her analysis of
the privacy issue, Justice Sears argued that society was not really
harmed by private consensual sexual acts, and that criminalizing the
conduct amounts to the majority imposing its morals on a minority."'
She branded this result "a mark of despotism, and a step backward

122 Ga. 190, 198, 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905).
107. 266 Ga. 474, 468 S.E.2d 188 (1996).
108. Id. at 474, 468 S.E.2d at 189; O.C.G.A. § 16-6-15(a) (1996).
109. 266 Ga. at 475, 468 S.E.2d at 189.
110. Id. Defendant also argued that the statutes violated his right to free expression.
Id. However, the fate of this claim was bound up with the court's decision whether the act
of solicitation could be criminalized. The court stated, "[r]easonable prohibitions against
soliciting unlawful acts do not violate free speech rights." Id. at 476, 468 S.E.2d at 190.
111. Id. at 476, 468 S.E.2d at 190.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 477, 468 S.E.2d at 190.
114. Id. at 479, 468 S.E.2d at 192.
115. Id. at 478, 468 S.E.2d at 191.
116. Id. at 482, 468 S.E.2d at 193-94.
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toward the majoritarian tyranny that our founders sought to escape.""' Justice Sears further argued that the majority had erred in
its legal reasoning by requiring only a rational basis for the limitation
on privacy rather than requiring a compelling interest."' She pointed
to prior cases suggesting that the sodomy statute implicates Georgia's
right to privacy, thus requiring the showing of a compelling interest to
override the right." 9 In her separate dissenting opinion, Justice
Hunstein agreed that the state had failed to provide the required
compelling justification. 20 Despite the vigorous and often passionate
dissents, the decision in Christensen closes the most recent chapter of
the battle over morality, privacy, and sexual freedom in Georgia. The
question now is when, and how, the next chapter will be written.
Excessive Fines: Forfeitures. Civil forfeitures have become a
favorite weapon in the war on drug trafficking. In recent years, the
courts have begun to be receptive to the notion that provisions long
thought to be creatures of the criminal justice system, like the excessive
fines clauses of the United States and Georgia Constitutions,' 2' should
be interpreted to limit civil forfeitures.122 In Austin v. United
States, 123 the United States Supreme Court applied the excessive fines
clause of the United States Constitution to civil forfeitures under the
federal statute authorizing forfeitures of property used in drug
crimes. 24 The Supreme Court reasoned that because the forfeitures
were, in part, designed to punish, that application of the excessive fines
clause was appropriate.'2 5 The decision in Austin explicitly declined
to articulate a test to determine excessiveness, leaving that task in the
first instance to the lower courts. 126 However, Justice Scalia, in a

117. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 194.
118. Id.
119. Id, at 483, 468 S.E.2d at 196, n.31.
120. Id. at 489, 468 S.E.2d at 199.
121. U.S. CONST. amend VIII; GA. CONsT. art. I, § 1, para. 17.
122. The other constitutional guarantee that has been applied as a limit on civil
penalties and taxes is the protection against double jeopardy. United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435 (1989) (civil penalty violated double jeopardy clause); Department of Revenue of
Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1993) (state tax violated double jeopardy clause).
However, the Supreme Court recently stopped the trend toward application of the double
jeopardy clause to in rem civil forfeitures, holding that such forfeitures are neither
punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. United States v.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
123. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
124. Id. at 602. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1996).
125. 509 U.S. at 622.
126. Id. at 622-23.
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concurring opinion, offered his view that the excessiveness analysis for
in rem forfeitures should be different from that applicable to monetary
fines, where the proportionality of the fine to the offense is relevant.127
Justice Scalia stated, "[t]he question is not how much the confiscated
property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close
enough relationship to the offense.""~ Thus, scales used to measure
illegal drugs are an instrumentality of the offense, and may be forfeited
"whether made of the purest gold or basest metal."129 But if the
property has an insufficient connection to the offense, such as a building
"in which an isolated drug sale happens to occur," the forfeiture would
be excessive." 0
In Thorp v. State,'3' the Georgia Supreme Court, consistent with
Austin, held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive
fines applies to civil in rem forfeitures under Georgia law.8 2 As for
the issue of defining the test to be applied, the court stated, "[wie decline
to adopt Justice Scalia's single-factor instrumentality test as the sole
test for determining if a forfeiture is excessive. We conclude that other
factors relating to proportionality are also relevant.""3 Noting that
the majority in Austin declined to adopt Justice Scalia's approach, the
Georgia Supreme Court in Thorp found that the very notion of "excessiveness" implies a comparison of the amount of the forfeiture to the
conduct being punished. 3 4 The court expressed disfavor of Justice
Scalia's test because it is based on the legal fiction that forfeiture is
warranted because the property is "guilty."3 ' The court went on to
adopt a three-factor test. 3 6 The test considers (1) the inherent gravity
of the offense compared with the harshness of the forfeiture; (2) whether
the property was an instrumentality; and (3) whether the property was
significantly involved in the crime "in terms of time and/or spatial
use."'37 The court stated, "[w]e conclude that an evaluation of these
three general factors well serves the scrutiny demanded by the Excessive

127. Id. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 628.
129. Id. at 627.
130. Id. at 628.
131. 264 Ga. 712, 450 S.E.2d 416 (1994).
132. See O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 (1996).
133. 264 Ga. at 714, 450 S.E.2d at 417.
134. Id. at 715, 450 S.E.2d at 418.
135. Id. at 714-15, 450 S.E.2d at 417-18.
136. The test was taken from United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725
(C.D. Cal. 1994).
137. 264 Ga. at 717, 450 S.E.2d at 420 (quoting 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. at
734-35).
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Fines Clause, and adopt them as minimal guidelines for excessiveness
inquiries in this State ...

."" Like the decision in Austin, Thorp left

the difficult case-by-case determination of excessiveness to the lower
courts. 139

Justice Carley, joined by Justice Thompson, concurred on the
applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause to in rem forfeitures, but
dissented as to the proper test.14° The dissenters sided with Justice
Scalia and stated a preference for the traditional test based on the
notion that the property was "guilty" because of its involvement in the
offense.'
If the dissent's point of view is subject to the charge that
the traditional test is based on a legal fiction, it can be defended on the
ground that the test is deeply rooted in long-standing precedent. 42
The beauty of the traditional instrumentality test is the ease with which
it can be applied. The dissenting opinion contrasted the subjective
guidelines established by the majority: "The 'proportionality' test
adopted by the majority is, in fact, no test at all, but sets an uncharted
course which the litigants and the courts now are required to navigate
without any degree of certainty."" The force of this argument will be
demonstrated as the courts grapple with the Thorp test.
B.

Offenses Defined and Related Issues

Murder: Merger Issues. In several decisions, the supreme court
interpreted its 1992 opinion in Edge v. State.'44 In Edge, the court
addressed the situation where a defendant was charged with malice
murder 45 and with a felony murder 4" charge, which was based on
the felony of aggravated assault, 47 for the same attack that caused the
death of the victim. 48 Edge was found guilty of voluntary manslaugh-

138.
139.
140.
part).
141.
142.

Id. at 718, 450 S.E.2d at 420.
Id. at 718 n.1, 450 S.E.2d at 420 n.1.
Id. at 718, 450 S.E.2d at 420 (Carley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Id. at 719-20, 450 S.E.2d at 420-21.
Id. at 720, 450 S.E.2d at 421.

143. Id.
144. 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992).
145. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(a) (1996). The statute states that "[a] person commits the

offense of murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, causes the death of another human being." Id.

146. Id. § 16-5-1(c). "Aperson also commits the offense of murder when, in the
commission of a felony, he causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice."

Id.
147. Id. § 16-5-21.
148. Edge, 261 Ga. at 865, 414 S.E.2d at 464.
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ter 4 9 rather than malice murder, meaning that the jury found defendant was acting subject to passions resulting from provocation."W
However, Edge also was convicted of felony murder despite the fact that
the felony murder charge was predicated on the felonious assault that
led to the death. 51 The court held that "if there is but one assault and
that assault could form the basis of either felony murder or voluntary
manslaughter, a verdict of felony murder may not be returned if the jury
finds that the assault is mitigated by provocation and passion."1 5 2 The
court noted that a contrary holding would effectively deprive the
defendant of the opportunity to be sentenced for the lesser offense of
voluntary manslaughter, because every voluntary manslaughter also
would constitute felony murder.'
However, the court declined to
adopt a rule precluding a felony murder conviction based on any
aggravated assault by the defendant on the victim.'" Instead, the
court adopted a rule precluding "a felony murder conviction only where
it would prevent an otherwise warranted verdict of voluntary manslaughter."5 5 This is Georgia's "modified merger rule."
In Foster v. State,' the supreme court confronted these facts: The
defendant, Foster, was engaged in a shoot-out with another person,
Perry, during which Foster accidently shot and killed an innocent third
party, Harderson. 5 7 Foster was convicted of both voluntary manslaughter and felony murder for the killing of Harderson.'
The
voluntary manslaughter conviction resulted when the jury apparently
found that provocation and passion, caused by Foster's fight with Perry,
mitigated the aggravated assault on Harderson, precluding a felony
murder conviction.'5 9 However, the jury did convict Foster of felony
murder for causing Harderson's death while committing aggravated
assault on Perry." Thus, the jury found Foster's aggravated assault
on Harderson to be mitigated by provocation and passion caused by
Perry, but did not find Foster's assault on Perry himself to be so

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 (1996).
261 Ga. at 865-66, 414 S.E.2d at 464-65.
Id.
Id. at 866, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
Id.
Id. at 867, 414 S.E.2d at 465.
Id.
264 Ga. 369, 444 S.E.2d 296 (1994).
Id. at 369, 444 S.E.2d at 296.
Id.
Id. at 369-70, 373, 444 S.E.2d at 297, 299 (Sears, J., dissenting).
Id.
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mitigated. 16 ' Foster's argument on appeal was that Edge precluded his
conviction on felony murder because the jury found the assault mitigated
by provocation and passion, as reflected in the voluntary manslaughter
verdict.162

The supreme court made two important pronouncements. First, the
court held that Edge was limited to the situation where the "evidence is
presented that would support both a voluntary manslaughter and felony
murder conviction based on an aggravated assault againstthe homicide
victim."" The court refused to extend the holding in Edge to situations where the evidence supports both a voluntary manslaughter and
felony murder conviction based on an aggravated assault against
In a dissenting opinion,
someone other than the homicide victim.'
Justice Sears took issue with the majority's interpretation of Edge and
argued that the assaults against Harderson (the homicide victim) and
Perry (the nonvictim) were not independent "because only one act and
one intent formed the basis of the two assault charges." 6 ' It follows,
according to the dissent, that the jury's finding of voluntary manslaughter for the assault on Harderson necessarily meant that the jury found
the assaults on both Harderson and Perry to be mitigated.'1 Justice
Sears concluded that the rationale of Edge compels the conclusion that
Foster's felony murder conviction, and life sentence, cannot stand.1 67
The debate between the majority and the dissent on whether Edge
should be held to preclude Foster's felony murder conviction is a close
one. However, because of the supreme court's other pronouncement in
Foster, the court is unlikely to face a similar situation in the future. In
a footnote, the supreme court stated that the jury should not have been
instructed on voluntary manslaughter for the felony murder charge
based on the assault against Harderson.'" The court adopted the view
that the voluntary manslaughter statute' 9 "should be construed so as
to authorize a conviction for that form of homicide only where the
defendant can show provocation by the homicide victim." 70 Of course,
161. The opinion in Foster does not explicitly say that the jury was instructed on
voluntary manslaughter as to the felony murder charge based on the assault on Perry, but
it does say the "trial court charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter, transferred intent
[sic] and felony murder." Id. at 369, 444 S.E.2d at 296.
162. Id.
163. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 297 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 370, 444 S.E.2d at 297.
165. Id. at 374, 444 S.E.2d at 299-300 (Sears, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167, Id.
168. Id. at 370, 444 S.E.2d at 297 n.2.
169. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a).
170. Foster,264 Ga. at 370, 444 S.E.2d at 297 n.2.
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this footnote is arguably of greater import than the rest of the opinion,
because it means the jury would not have to be authorized to find that
Perry's provocation mitigated Harderson's death from felony murder to
manslaughter. Put another way, a defendant who is provoked within
the meaning of the voluntary manslaughter statute, but who kills
someone other than his intended victim, will be guilty of felony murder.
The court recognized that prior decisions had allowed a voluntary
manslaughter instruction for the death of an unintended victim based
on the theory of transferred mitigated intent. 71 The court dismissed
those decisions as outdated after the adoption of the current felony
17 2
murder statute, which allows a conviction to be based on any felony.
Justice Sears, in her dissent, argued that the pronouncement contained
in footnote two was not consistent with prior Georgia decisions,
the
17
position of many other jurisdictions, and the rule of lenity. 1
In Jones v. State,74 the supreme court reversed the felony murder
conviction of a defendant who had been acquitted of an accompanying
malice murder charge because the jury charge failed to meet the
requirements set forth in Edge.1 5 Jones was charged with malice
murder and felony murder based on the same aggravated assault that
led to the death of the victim. 17 The trial court properly instructed
the jury on the malice murder count, including a charge on voluntary
manslaughter, which was supported by the evidence. 177 However, the
trial court did not give the jury a separate admonishment concerning the
role of provocation and passion with respect to the felony murder
count.1 78 Edge required a distinct charge to the jury authorizing a
voluntary manslaughter conviction on the felony murder count if the
jury "finds provocation and passion with respect to the act which caused
the killing." 79 In Jones, the omission of this instruction was held to
be reversible error.8"
The supreme court's decision in Hayes v. State'' also involved issues
arising from the jury's consideration of multiple charges based on a
single killing. Defendant was convicted of malice murder, felony

171.
172.

Id.
Id.

173. Id. at 371-73, 444 S.E.2d at 298-99 (Sears, J., dissenting).
174. 265 Ga. 203, 455 S.E.2d 34 (1995).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 204-05, 455 S.E.2d at 36.
Id.
Id. at 205, 455 S.E.2d at 36,
Id.
Edge, 261 Ga. at 868 n.3, 444 S.E.2d at 466 n.3.
Jones, 265 Ga. at 205, 455 S.E.2d at 36.
265 Ga. 1, 453 S.E.2d 11 (1995).
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murder, and aggravated assault."' 2 The facts were that over several
minutes Hayes attacked a man named Hillman and stabbed him, chased
Hillman down when he fled, and then stabbed him to death.'
Despite adequate evidence to support all three counts of conviction, the
trial court merged the malice murder conviction into the felony murder
8 4 The trial court also
conviction and sentenced Hayes to a life term."
sentenced
Hayes to a concurrent term of years on the aggravated assault
85
count.1

With respect to the merger of the malice murder count into the felony
murder count, the court did not find reversible error.'
The penalties
for malice murder and felony murder are the same, 8 7 so the decision
of which count sentence should be imposed is a matter of form.
However, the majority indicated that the preferred approach is to impose
sentence on the malice murder charge, except in the rare instance where
the trial court finds the evidence sufficient to support the felony murder
conviction, but not the malice murder verdict.'" The majority also
reversed Hayes's concurrent sentence on the aggravated assault charge
because that count should have merged with the felony murder
count.18 9
Only three justices concurred in these two portions of the court's
opinion, which were both contained in division two."9 Justice Carley
wrote a dissenting opinion joined by one other justice.' 9 ' The dissent
contended that the trial court should have sentenced Hayes on the
malice murder count, and that the court should have reversed and
remanded for sentence to be imposed on the proper count. 92 The
dissent found the discussion of "merger" misplaced, because the
alternative felony murder count is statutorily vacated under O.C.G.A.
section 16-1-7.19' The dissent also took issue with the vacating of the

182. Id. at 1, 453 S.E.2d at 11.
183. Id., 453 S.E.2d at 13.
184. Id. at 2, 453 S.E.2d at 13.
185. Id. at 1, 453 S.E.2d at 12.
186. Id. at 2, 453 S.E.2d at 13.
187. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(d) (1996).
188. Hayes, 265 Ga. at 2 n.2, 453 S.E.2d at 13 n.2.
189. Id. at 2, 453 S.E.2d at 13.
190. Id. at 3, 453 S.E.2d at 14-16.
191. Id. at 3-6, 453 S.E.2d at 14-16.
192. Id. at 4-5, 453 S.E.2d at 14-15.
193. Id. at 4, 453 S.E.2d at 14-15. See O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7, which provides as follows:
(a) When the same conduct of an accused may establish the commission of more
than one crime, the accused may be prosecuted for each crime. He may not,
however, be convicted of more than one crime if:
(1) One crime is included in the other; or
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defendant's concurrent sentence for aggravated assault, stating that
there was evidence that Hayes engaged in two successive knife attacks
on the victim over a span of time, the second of which was the fatal
Under this view, the first nonfatal attack was sufficient
attack.'
basis to support the separate sentence for assault. 19s
Predicate Felony. Wayne Chapman was
Felony Murder.
convicted of felony murder after he shot a hunting companion while
The predicate, or underlying, felony for the felony
hunting for deer.'
murder charge was the crime of misuse of a firearm while hunting. 9"
That offense "requires a conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that an act or omission 'will cause harm to or
endanger' the bodily safety of another person.""' Where serious bodily
In Chapman v. State,
harm actually results, the crime is a felony.'
the Georgia Supreme Court held that the crime of misuse of a firearm
20 0
while hunting was a proper predicate for a felony murder charge.
Justice Sears, joined by Justice Fletcher, dissented. The dissent argued

(2) The crimes differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of
conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct.
(b) If the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper
prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the
jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution
except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section.
(c) When two or more crimes are charged as required by subsection (b) of this
Code section, the court in the interest of justice may order that one or more of
such charges be tried separately.
O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7 (1996).
194. 265 Ga. at 5-6, 453 S.E.2d at 15-16.
195. Id. at 5, 453 S.E.2d at 15.
196. Chapman v. State, 266 Ga. 356, 467 S.E.2d 497 (1996).
197. Id. at 356, 467 S.E.2d at 498.
198. Id. at 357,467 S.E.2d at 499 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-11-108(a)). O.C.G.A. § 16-11108(a) states as follows:
Any person who while hunting wildlife uses a firearm or archery tackle in a
manner to endanger the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm
to or endanger the safety of another person and the disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in
the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor; provided, however, if such conduct
results in serious bodily harm to another person, the person engaging in such
conduct shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $5,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one nor
more than ten years, or both.
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-108(a) (1996).
199. 266 Ga. at 358, 467 S.E.2d at 499.
200. Id., 467 S.E.2d at 499-500.
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that the legislature had not intended the crime to be a felony murder
predicate, reasoning that the legislature had specified lower penalties for
misuse of a firearm while hunting that caused serious bodily harm.2"'
However, the statute refers only to "serious bodily injury" and it is
unclear whether the legislature intended to preclude the charge of felony
murder where the serious bodily injury results in death.
Homicide: Lesser Included Offenses. In State v. Freeman, °2
the supreme court had occasion to reconsider the question of whether a
trial court should accept a verdict on a lesser included homicide offense
on which the jury had not been charged. At Freeman's murder trial, the
jury brought back a verdict convicting defendant of involuntary
manslaughter, even though the trial court had not given instructions on
that offense. 20 ' The judge refused to accept that verdict and sent the
jury back to deliberate. 2°4 The jury later convicted Freeman of voluntary manslaughter.0 5 The court of appeals reversed, finding that the
jury's initial verdict of involuntary manslaughter was, in effect, an
acquittal of voluntary manslaughter.2 ° In so ruling, the court of
appeals relied on a longstanding precedent, Register v. State, where the
court of appeals decided a case in which the supreme court was evenly
divided.2 7 Register held that even a verdict that is nonresponsive to
the jury charge should be accepted if it is a verdict on a lesser included
offense of the crime charged.2 '
In Freeman, the supreme court unanimously overruled Register.2 °
The basis of the supreme court's decision was nonresponsive verdicts are
a violation of the jury's duty to accept the trial court's instructions.2 0
The court held that "the proper procedure henceforth is for the trial
court and counsel to review the verdict prior to its publication," and if
the verdict is nonresponsive, the trial court should have the jury resume
deliberations and return a verdict "within the range of the instructions
originally given to it.""'

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 359, 467 S.E.2d at 500.
264 Ga. 276, 444 S.E.2d 80 (1994).
Id. at 276, 444 S.E.2d at 80.
Id., 444 S.E.2d at 80-81.
Id., 444 S.E.2d at 81.
Id.
Id.; Register v. State, 10 Ga. App. 623, 74 S.E. 429 (1911).
264 Ga. at 276-77, 444 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 277-78, 444 S.E.2d at 81-82.
Id. at 277, 444 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 278, 444 S.E.2d at 82.
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The related issue of the quantum of evidence needed to request 21a2
charge on a lesser included offense was at issue in Moses v. State.
Defendant was convicted of malice murder for suffocating his girlfriend's
infant son.2 3 Central to the state's case were statements defendant
made to a detective. Those statements included defendant's claim that
he placed his hand over the infant's mouth to stop him from crying and
that the infant went limp. 2' 4 Defendant argued that he was entitled

to a charge on misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter 5 because the
statements to the detective are consistent with his commission of a
lawful act in an unlawful manner.216 The trial court did instruct the
jury on felony involuntary manslaughter,217 which requires proof that
a death was caused during the commission of a misdemeanor. In
addressing the trial court's failure to charge the jury on misdemeanor
involuntary manslaughter, the supreme court restated the test:
"[Wihere even the slightest evidence shows that the defendant may be
guilty of a lessor included offense, then a requested charge on that
offense must be given."218 In Moses, the supreme court hinted at the
limits of the very broad "slightest evidence" test with respect to a
requested charge of misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter, finding
that defendant's conduct in putting his hand over the infant's mouth
could not qualify as a "lawful act."21 9 The court reasoned that defendant's act was not lawful because he'prevented the child's breathing long
enough to cause brain damage, which was reckless conduct within the
meaning of the criminal statute making reckless endangerment of

212. 264. Ga. 313, 444 S.E.2d 767 (1994).
213. Id. at 313, 444 S.E.2d at 768.
214. Id. at 314, 444 S.E.2d at 769.
215. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(b) (1996). The statute provides as follows:
A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of
a lawful act in an unlawful manner when he causes the death of another human
being without any intention to do so, by the commission of a lawful act in an
unlawful manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm. A person who
commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act
in an unlawful manner, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as for a
misdemeanor.
Id.
216. Moses, 264 Ga. at 315, 444 S.E.2d at 769.
217. OC.G.A. § 16-5-3(a).
218. 264 Ga. at 315, 444 S.E.2d at 769-70 (citing Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 442
S.E.2d 444 (1994)).
219. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 770.
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another a misdemeanor." The presence of the reckless endangerment
statute will prevent most reckless conduct from qualifying as a "lawful
act," thereby precluding a charge on misdemeanor voluntary manslaugh" '
ter, even under the "slightest evidence" test.22
The supreme court discussed the permissible methods for the state to
formulate indictments charging alternative theories of liability for a
single act in Lumpkins v. State.2" Defendant had been charged in
alternative counts with three crimes arising out of a single homicide:
malice murder, felony murder while in the commission of an aggravated
assault, and felony murder while in the commission of an armed
robbery.223 The supreme court held that the state has the option of
framing the indictment in such a case as a single count with alternative
allegations, or as alternative counts.224 The court noted that the state
is justified in preferring the alternative count method because it reduces
the chance of ambiguous verdicts.22 The court was unimpressed with
the claim that alternative count indictments are confusing to the
jury.2 ' However, Chief Justice Hunt wrote a concurring opinion in
which he suggested submitting
a detailed verdict form to the jury
27
instead of the indictment.
2
Vehicular Homicide. Georgia's vehicular homicide statute 1
allows for conviction of drivers causing death while violating several
other code sections. Some of the code violations upon which a vehicular
homicide charge may be predicated require proof of "driving under the
influence," while others merely require proof of driving with any amount

220. Id. See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b), which provides as follows:
A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another
person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act
or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a
reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor.
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b) (1996).
221. The relationship of the reckless endangerment statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b), to
the availability of a charge on misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter is illustrated by
another case from the survey period, Howard v. State, 213 Ga. App. 542, 445 S.E.2d 532
(1994), cert. denied.
222. 264. Ga. 255, 443 S.E.2d 619 (1994).
223. Id. at 255, 443 S.E.2d at 619.
224. Id. at 255-56, 443 S.E.2d at 620.
225. Id. at 257, 443 S.E.2d at 621.
226. Id. at 258, 443 S.E.2d at 621.
227. Id. at 259, 443 S.E.2d at 622.
228. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393 (1996).
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In Kevinezz v. State,'" " the
of illegal drugs in driver's system.'
supreme court held that an indictment accusing a defendant with
driving "under the influence" of alcohol or drugs did not put defendant
on notice that she could be convicted under the provision prohibiting the
act of driving a motor vehicle with "any amount of marijuana or a
controlled
substance ...
23 1
both.

present in the person's blood or urine, or

Kevinezz had been indicted for one count of vehicular homicide (Count
1) and for one count of "driving under the influence to the extent it is
less safe for the person to drive" (Count 2).232 The trial court found
insufficient evidence of impaired driving ability and directed a verdict
on Count 2.233 The jury considered Count 1. Although the indictment
alleged that Kevinezz caused the death of the victim "'in reckless
disregard for the safety of persons and property by driving under the
influence of drugs,'" the trial court instructed the jury that it could
convict defendant of Count 1 if it found she was driving with "any
amount" of marijuana or cocaine in her system. 234 The jury convicted
defendant of vehicular homicide. 2 5 Defendant argued that she was
not on notice that she could be convicted on a theory not requiring
impaired driving ability." ' Kevinezz contended that the indictment
was limited to "driving under the influence" of drugs, a phrase which

229.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 (1995) (statute's numbering has subsequently changed from

(5) to (6)). The statute provides as follows:
(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any moving vehicle
while:...
(2) under the influence of any drug to the extent that it is less safe for the
person to drive;...
(5) The person's alcohol concentration is 0.10 grams or more at any time within
three hours after such driving or being in actual physical control from alcohol
consumed before such driving or being in actual physical control ended;

(6) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section, there is any
amount of marijuana or a controlled substance, as defined in Code Section 16-1321, present in the person's blood or urine, or both, including the metabolites and
derivatives of each or both without regard to whether or not any alcohol is present
in the person's breath or blood.
Id.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

265 Ga. 78, 454 S.E.2d 441 (1995).
Id. at 79, 454 S.E.2d at 443. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.
256 Ga. at 79-80, 454 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 40-6-361(a)(2)).
Id. at 80, 454 S.E.2d at 443.
Id.
Id. at 78, 454 S.E.2d at 442.
Id. at 79, 454 S.E.2d at 443.
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requires proof that she was under the influence to the extent that it
made it less safe for her to drive.2" 7
The supreme court accepted this interpretation of the statutory
language "driving under the influence" and held that the vehicular
homicide count using that language did not put Kevinezz on notice that
she could be convicted based on a violation of the code section prohibiting driving with any amount of illegal drugs in her system."'8 In
reaching this conclusion, the supreme court overruled a prior court of
appeals decision239 that held the "driving under the influence" language was sufficient to put the defendant on notice under the code
section prohibiting driving with a certain blood-alcohol count, although
the blood-alcohol count provision did not require proof of impaired
driving ability.24 The supreme court found that the prior decision ran
"headlong into the rule that when a crime can be committed in more
than one way, the prosecution cannot be permitted to prove that crime
in a different manner than that alleged in the indictment."24' Furthermore, the supreme court held that defendant had not waived her
challenge to the indictment by failing to specially demur.242 The court
reasoned that the indictment did charge Kevinezz with an offense, and
she was not required to specially demur to avoid waiving a claim that
the jury instructions allowed conviction for a crime not charged. 2'
Prosecutors should easily be able to avoid the problem that beset the
prosecution of Kevinezz. Indictments for vehicular homicide should be
drafted to specify each code section forming a basis for liability. The
decision in Kevinezz should not pose a significant impediment to future
vehicular homicide prosecutions. 2 "
Attempted Stalking. In State v. Rooks,245 the supreme court
declared that there is a crime of attempted stalking in Georgia. The

237. Id. at 80, 454 S.E.2d at 443.
238. Id. at 82, 454 S.E.2d at 444.
239. Scott v. State, 207 Ga. App. 533, 428 S.E.2d 359 (1993).
240. Id. at 534-35, 428 S.E.2d at 361. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(4) (statute's
numbering has subsequently changed to (a)(5)). At the time of the Scott decision, the

statute prohibited driving with a .12% blood-alcohol count; it has since been changed to
.10%. Id.
241. 265 Ga. at 81, 454 S.E.2d at 444.
242. Id. at 83, 454 S.E.2d at 445.
243. Id.
244. It should be noted that Kevinezz also held that O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(aX5) (statute's
numbering subsequently changed to (a)(6)), which prohibits driving with "any amount" of

illegal drugs in one's system, is not unconstitutionally vague. 265 Ga. at 78-79, 454 S.E.2d
at 442.
245. 266 Ga. 528, 468 S.E. 2d 354 (1996).
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court of appeals had found that it was legally impossible to attempt to
stalk, reasoning that stalking is a form of assault and that Georgia does
not recognize a crime of attempted assault.246 The supreme court
disagreed, holding that there are important differences between the
crime of stalking and the crime of assault.24 7 In particular, the
stalking statute does not require proof of fear of immediate injury.2"
Also, stalking may be committed by threatening a member of the victim's
family, while assault requires a threat against the assault victim. 249
Based on these differences, the supreme court concluded that stalking
is not purely an assault crime.2 " Recognizing that it had previously
dismissed the crime of attempted assault as absurd and impractical, the
supreme court stated:
To attempt to stalk, however, is to attempt to follow, place under
surveillance or contact another person. It is neither absurd nor
impractical to subject to criminal sanction such actions when they are
done with the requisite specific intent to cause emotional distress by
inducing reasonable fear of death or bodily injury,"l

246. State v. Rooks, 217 Ga. App. 643, 458 S.E.2d 667 (1995), rev'd, 266 Ga. 528, 468
S.E.2d 354 (1996).
247. 266 Ga. at 529, 468 S.E.2d at 355-56.
248. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 356. See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90, which states as follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of stalking when he or she follows, places under
surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the
consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the
other person. For the purpose of this article, the term "place or places" shall
include any public or private property occupied by the victim other than the
residence of the defendant For the purposes of this article, the term "harassing
and intimidating" means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person which causes emotional distress by placing such person in
reasonable fear of death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to a member of his
or her immediate family, and which serves no legitimate purpose. This Code
section shall not be constued to require that an overt threat of death or bodily
injury has been made.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, a person who commits
the offense of stalking is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c) Upon the second conviction, and all subsequent convictions, for stalking, the
defendant shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than one year nor more than five years.
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90 (1996).
249. 266 Ga. at 529, 468 S.E.2d at 356.
250. Id. at 530, 468 S.E.2d at 356.
251. Id. at 529, 468 S.E.2d at 356.

248

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Cruelty to Children. The supreme court faced two questions in
Brewton v. State.252 The first question was whether the crime of
cruelty to children2. can be committed by raising a child in unsanitary
conditions. The court answered this legal question with ease, stating,
"[wle have no hesitation in holding that the offense may be committed
by raising a child in such unsanitary conditions that the child suffers
cruel or excessive physical or mental pain."2 ' The second question
proved more difficult: May evidence of unsanitary conditions, by itself,
prove that the conduct of the defendant was malicious?256 The court
considered a variety of hypothetical situations involving a single parent
who was ill, a parent who was young and ignorant, and a parent who
was attempting to teach a child to clean by requiring the child to live in
the unclean area.2 56 The court concluded that "there are conceivable
justifications for the existence of unsanitary conditions" and that "it is
clear that such conditions, alone, cannot serve to prove the element of
malice in a prosecution for cruelty to children."257 Finding no corroborating evidence in the record, the supreme court reversed the conviction.26 8 In essence, the court grafted onto the cruelty to children
statute a rule that malice cannot be found based only on the nature of
the unsanitary conditions, but that the circumstances must establish the
lack of a justification.
Sexual Offenses Against Children. The court of appeals reversed
defendant's conviction for aggravated child molestation in Johnston v.
State,2" but used the case to announce a new rule governing tolling of
the statute of limitations in cases involving sexual offenses against
children. Richard Johnston was indicted on May 5, 1993 for aggravated
child molestation.2" The conduct for which Johnston was indicted

252. 266 Ga. 160, 465 S.E.2d 668 (1996).
253. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b) (1996). The statute provides as follows:
Any person commits the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree when
such person maliciously causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive
physical or mental pain. Any person commits the offense of cruelty to children in
the second degree when such person intentionally allows a minor to witness the
commission of a forcible felony.

Id.
254. Brewton, 266 Ga. at 160, 465 S.E.2d at 669.
255. Id. at 161, 465 S.E.2d at 669.
256. Id. at 161-62, 465 S.E.2d at 669-70.

257. Id. at 162, 465 S.E.2d at 670.
258. Id.
259. 213 Ga. App. 579, 445 S.E.2d 566 (1994).
260. Id. at 579, 445 S.E.2d at 566. See O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 (1996).
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ceased in May 1985, over seven years before his indictment.26
Because the statute of limitations applicable to Johnston's offense262
requires prosecution within seven years, the court reversed the
conviction.2"' However, the court of appeals noted that the legislature
had extended the statute of limitations for sexual offenses against
children committed after July 1, 1992, the law's effective date.2'
While that legislature's action did not apply to Johnston's case, it was
the impetus for the court of appeals to reconsider its prior decision in
Sears V. State,265 which held that the infancy of the victim does not toll
the running of the statute of limitations period. 2 " The court acknowledged the wisdom of extending the statute of limitations for crimes
against children, who may not be able to understand the crime until
becoming more mature.26 7 Therefore, the court held that as of June
17, 1994, "infancy shall toll the statute of limitations for those crimes
until the victim is 16 years of age or until the violation is reported to
The court's
law enforcement authorities, whichever is earlier."'
holding tracks the legislative extention of the limitations period for

261. 213 Ga. App. at 579, 445 S.E.2d at 566.
262. O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1(c) (1990 & Supp. 1996).
263. Johnston, 213 Ga. App. at 579, 445 S.E.2d at 567.
264. Id. at 579 n.1, 445 S.E.2d at 567 n.1. See O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.1, which provides as
follows:
(a) If the victim of a violation of:
(1) Code Section 16-5-70, relating to cruelty to children;
(2) Code Section 16-6-1, relating to rape;
(3) Code Section 16-6-2, relating to sodomy and aggravated sodomy;
(4) Code Section 16-6-3, relating to statutory rape;
(5) Code Section 16-6-4, relating to child molestation and aggravated child
molestation;
(6) Code Section 16-6-5, relating to enticing a child for indecent purposes; or
(7) Code Section 16-6-22, relating to incest,
is under 16 years of age on the date of violation, the applicable period within
which a prosecution must be commenced under Code Section 17-3-1 or other
applicable statute shall not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of
16 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency, prosecuting attorney,
or other governmental agency, whichever occurs earlier. Such law enforcement
agency or other governmental agency shall promptly report such allegation to the
appropriate prosecuting attorney.
(b) This Code section shall apply to any offense designated in paragraphs (1)
through (7) of subsection (a) of this Code section occurring on or after July 1, 1992.
O.C.G.A. § 17-3-1.2 (1990 & Supp. 1996).
265. 182 Ga. App. 480, 356 S.E.2d 72 (1987).
266. Johnston, 213 Ga. App. at 579, 445 S.E.2d at 567.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 580, 445 S.E.2d at 567.
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offenses committed after July 1, 1992.29 The court limited its holding
to cases, unlike Johnston's, in which the statute of limitations had not
yet expired.27 Therefore, the court's holding extends the statute of
limitations period for sexual offenses against children that occurred
between June 17, 1987 and July 1, 1992, the effective date of the
legislative extention. The limitation period for offenses occurring more
than seven years before the 271
decision in Johnston "has already expired
and cannot now be revived.

In Davis v. State,272 the court of appeals addressed merger issues
raised by the charging of multiple counts for a single episode involving
sexual abuse of a child. Davis was charged, among other things, with
aggravated sexual battery,273 child molestation, 4 and aggravated
assault with intent to rape.27 ' Defendant argued that the aggravated
sexual battery charge and the aggravated assault charge merged with
the child molestation charge and that the trial court was in error to
sentence him on each count.27 6 Under the statute governing convictions for lesser included offenses, offenses merge only if one of them "is
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts" used to
establish the other.27 7 With respect to the claim that the aggravated
sexual battery charge merged with the child molestation charge, the
court in Davis noted that the sexual battery charge involved proof of
penetration of the victim with a foreign object while the child molestation charge involved defendant's separate acts of removing the panties

269. See O.C.G.A. § 17-3-2.1.
270. Johnston, 213 Ga. App. at 580, 445 S.E.2d at 567.

271. Id.
272. 214 Ga. App. 360, 448 S.E.2d 26 (1994).
273. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2 (1996). The statute provides as follows:
(a) For the purposes of this Code section, the term "foreign object" means any
article or instrument other than the sexual organ of a person.
(b) A person commits the offense of aggravated sexual battery when he
intentionally penetrates with a foreign object the sexual organ or anus of another
person without the consent of that person.
(c) A person convicted of the offense of aggravated sexual battery shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years. Any
person convicted under this Code section shall, in addition, be subject to the
sentencing and punishment provisions of Code Sections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7.
Id.
274. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 (a) (1996). The statute states that "[a] person commits the
offense of child molestation when he or she does any immoral or indecent act to or in the
presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy
the sexual desires of either the child or the person." Id.
275. Dauis, 214 Ga. App. at 361-62, 448 S.E.2d at 28. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) (1996).
276. 214 Ga. App. at 361, 448 S.E.2d at 27-28.
277. O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1) (1996).
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of the victim and exposing his sex organ.27 Similarly, the court found
that the aggravated assault charge involved proof of separate acts from
those underlying the child molestation charge, such as the defendant's
attempt to penetrate the victim with his sex organ.279 The analysis of
the sexual battery and child molestation charges appears sound because
each crime involves proof of facts that the other does not. However, the
court's analysis of the aggravated battery charge is open to question
because the facts supporting the child molestation charge (i.e., defendant
pulling down the victim's panties and exposing himself) appear to be
"less than all the facts" needed to prove the crime of aggravated assault
with intent to commit rape.2' In any event, Davis provides support
for multi-count charging strategies in cases based on single episodes of
sexual abuse. Multiple charges can complicate a case, but they allow
prosecutors to present several theories upon which guilt can be
determined.
An example of an overly aggressive multi-count charging strategy can
be found in Bragg v. State.2"' Prosecutors charged Bragg with several
counts of aggravated child molestation and child molestation, and added
two counts charging Bragg with enticing two of the children for indecent
purposes. 2 The crime of enticing a child for indecent purposes has an
"asportation" element requiring that the defendant "take" the child from
one place to another, however slight the distance, by force, enticement,

278. Davis, 214 Ga. App. at 361, 448 S.E.2d at 28.
279. Id. at 361-62, 448 S.E.2d at 28.
280. Id. at 361, 457 S.E.2d at 28. See O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(2).
281. 217 Ga. App. 342, 457 S.E.2d 262 (1995).
282. Id. See O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5, which provides as follows:
A person commits the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes when he or
she solicits, entices, or takes any child under the age of 16 years to any place
whatsoever for the purpose of child molestation or indecent acts. A person
convicted of the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. Upon a first
conviction of the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes, the judge may
probate the sentence; and such probation may be upon the special condition that
the defendant undergo a mandatory period of counseling administered by a
licensed psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist. However, if the judge finds that
such probation should not be imposed, he shall sentence the defendant to
imprisonment. Upon a second or third conviction of such offense, the defendant
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five years. For a fourth or
subsequent conviction of the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes, the
defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for 20 years. Adjudication of guilt
or imposition of sentence for a conviction of a third, fourth, or subsequent offense
of enticing a child for indecent purposes, including a plea of nolo contendere, shall
not be suspended, probated, deferred, or withheld.
O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5 (1996).
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or persuasion."' The state based the enticing charge on the theory
that defendant had caused the children to enter a certain room.m The
court of appeals reversed defendant's convictions of the two counts of
enticing the children for indecent purposes because the record lacked
any evidence concerning how the children came to be present in the
room with defendant.2" The court rejected the state's argument that
the asportation element was met because defendant threatened to
punish the children if they attempted to leave the room. 286 The state's
argument obviously stretched the concept of asportation beyond
recognition.
Robbery/Theft. Melvin Lewis Bland was convicted of murder and
two counts of armed robbery arising out of Bland's robbing and shooting
his victim. 287 Although this was a single armed robbery, Bland was
charged with taking the victim's wallet in one robbery count and taking
the victim's pick-up truck in the other robbery count. 2'
Bland was
convicted of both counts and received consecutive twenty year terms of
imprisonment on each of the robbery counts.' 9 In Bland v. State,'
the supreme court found that the trial court erred when it failed to join
the two robbery counts and directed that the second robbery sentence be
vacated.29 The court reaffirmed the rule that "where there is only one
victim who is robbed of more than
one item in a single transanction, only
292
one robbery may be charged."
A similar issue was raised before the court of appeals in Snelling v.
State,293 with a similar outcome. During the robbery of a restaurant,
it was alleged that defendant took money belonging to the restaurant
from the presence of an employee by use of a gun.29' In a separate
count, it was alleged that during the same robbery, defendant, using a
gun, took credit cards belonging to the restaurant employee from the

283. Bragg, 217 Ga. App. at 342, 457 S.E.2d at 262.
284. Id. at 343, 457 S.E.2d at 262.

285. Id., 457 S.E.2d at 263.
286. Id.

287. Bland v. State, 264 Ga. 610, 449 S.E.2d 116 (1994). Bland was also charged with
escape and aggravated assault of a jailer for his conduct after being captured for the
murder and robbery. Id. at 610, 449 S.E.2d at 116-17.
288. Id. at 612, 449 S.E.2d at 118.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 610, 449 S.E.2d at 116.
291. Id. at 612, 449 S.E.2d at 118.
292. Id.
293. 215 Ga. App. 263, 450 S.E.2d 299 (1994).
294. Id. at 263, 450 S.E.2d at 300.
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employee.295 The court found that there was a single robbery and held
that it was error to enter judgment and sentence on two armed robbery
counts.2 9
King v. State297 addressed the issue of what crimes are lesser
included offenses of the crime of robbery by sudden snatching. 28 The
incident at issue was as follows: Defendant entered a convenience store
and asked if the store accepted credit cards. When the store clerk
answered in the affirmative, defendant asked for six cartons of
cigarettes, worth eighty-six dollars. The store clerk placed the cartons
on the counter. While the store clerk glanced away, defendant took the
cigarettes and ran out of the store.'
Defendant was convicted of
robbery by sudden snatching, which requires proof that defendant, with
intent to commit theft, took property from the presence of another by
sudden snatching.0 0
The court of appeals considered defendant's claim that the trial court
had committed error by refusing to instruct the jury on several lesser
included offenses. Specifically, defendant requested instructions on
three other offenses, namely, theft by taking,'O theft by deception, 0 '
and theft by shoplifting.3 3 Although the court found no evidence or
conduct by defendant to support the instruction on theft by deception,3' the court held that the facts required granting requests for
instructions on theft by taking and theft by shoplifting.0 5 The difference between the crime of robbery by sudden snatching and the crimes
of theft by taking and deception is that robbery requires the taking be
from the person or presence of another."° The court certainly was
correct in concluding that the theft offenses are established by "proof of
the same or less than all the facts" required to prove robbery.0 7 The
analytical problem with the court's position is that it is inconceivable
that the finder of fact could find that the evidence did not support the

295.

Id.

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 268, 450 S.E,2d at 304.
214 Ga. App. 311, 447 S.E.2d 645 (1994).
O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3) (1996).
King, 214 Ga. App. at 311, 447 S.E.2d at 646.
Id. See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3).
O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 (1996).
Id. § 16-8-3.
Id. § 16-8-14(a).
King, 214 Ga. App. at 313-14, 447 S.E.2d at 648-49.
Id.
Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40(a)(3) with O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-2, -3 & -14(a).
King, 214 Ga. App. at 311, 447 S.E.2d at 648. See O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6 (1996).
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conclusion that the taking was from the presence of another person."'
If that is so, the instructions on the lesser included theft offenses become
a recipe for a compromise verdict that ignores the uncontroverted fact
that the taking was from the presence of the store clerk. The state
urged the court to adopt a rule limiting lesser included offense instructions to cases where there is a real issue of whether the greater offense
has been completed." ° The court's rejoinder to this argument was that
the general rule is that an instruction on a lesser included offense should
be given where there is any evidence that the defendant is guilty of the
lesser offense. 1° The court's rejoinder, however, appears to miss the
mark because the facts of King do not suggest any evidence on which the
jury could conclude that King was guilty of the lesser theft offense but
not guilty of the greater robbery offense.
In Dukes v. State,"'1 the supreme court confronted a constitutional
issue raised by the form of the indictment in a theft case. Dukes, who
ran a wrecking service and body shop, was convicted of stealing two cars.
He was charged with two counts of theft by taking." 2 The indictment
charged Dukes in each count with the unlawful taking of another's
property. 13 Neither count of the indictment charged Dukes under the
second clause of the theft by taking statute, which proscribes the
unlawful appropriation of the property of another while in lawful
possession of it.314 However, the trial court gave a jury instruction
quoting the entire theft by taking statute, including the appropriation
clause, thus creating the possibility that the jury might have convicted
Dukes on a legal basis not included in the indictment. 15 This possibility may well have become reality in Dukes's case because the evidence
showed that he had been asked to store one of the allegedly stolen cars,
thereby coming into lawful possession of that car.31 5 The supreme
court reversed Dukes's conviction for theft of the car he had been asked
to store, holding that his conviction on a basis for liability not set forth
in the indictment was a denial of due process. 17

308. Indeed, the court rejected defendant's claim that the store clerk was unaware of
the theft. 214 Ga. App. at 311-12, 447 S.E.2d at 647.
309. Id. at 312, 447 S.E.2d at 647.

310. Id.
311. 265 Ga. 422, 457 S.E.2d 556 (1995).
312. Id. at 422, 457 S.E.2d at 557.

313.
314.
315.
316.

Id.
Id. See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 (1996).
265 Ga. at 422, 457 S.E.2d at 557.
Id.

317. Id. at 423-24, 457 S.E.2d at 558.
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Burglary. In Georgia, a person commits "burglary when, without
authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein," he
enters the house of another person.3 18 In 1993, the supreme court was
confronted with a case in which a man charged with burglary could not
have entered the house of the victim "without authority" because he and
the victim either lived together or were married. 19 In that case, the
court held that the trial court should have instructed the jury that if
defendant lived with or was married to the victim, that the jury must
acquit defendant of burglary 2 ° In State v. Kennedy, 21 the supreme
court reconsidered this holding and disapproved the prior decision to the
extent that it stated that, as a matter of law, a married defendant
cannot commit burglary against a spouse. 22 In doing so, the court
expressed its concern over the current Georgia theft statutes, which
exempt the unauthorized taking of property from a spouse.32 The
court explicitly asked the legislature to consider whether the marital
exemption under the theft statutes should be abolished. 324 The court's
interpretation of the burglary statute is a welcome development;
legislative action changing the theft statute would be another.
Firearms Offenses. The defendant in Jones v. State121 was
charged with the following six crimes: malice murder, felony murder
with aggravated assault as the underlying offense, two counts of
aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during commission of a
crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon. 26 Jones moved to
bifurcate the trial on the felon-in-possession charge from the other
charges. The trial court denied the motion.327 Jones was convicted of
the felony murder charge and the felon-in-possession charge.3 21 On
appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's denial of the motion to
bifurcate.329

318. O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 (1996).
319. Mitchell v. State, 263 Ga. 129, 130-31, 429 S.E.2d 517, 518 (1993), overruled by
State v. Kennedy, 266 Ga. 195, 467 S.E.2d 493 (1996).
320. Id
321. 266 Ga. 195, 467 S.E.2d 493 (1996).
322. Id. at 195-96, 467 S.E.2d at 493-94.
323. Id. at 196, 467 S.E.2d at 494 n.1. See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-1 (1996).
324. Id.
325. 265 Ga. 138, 454 S.E.2d 482 (1995).
326. Id. at 138, 454 S.E.2d at 484.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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Under a prior decision of the supreme court, Head v. State, a motion
to bifurcate should be granted where a felon-in-possession charge is
unrelated to other charges in the indictment.330 In Head, the supreme
court held that it was error not to bifurcate a felon-in-possession count
from an armed robbery count because the defendant's prior convictions
had "nothing to do with any element of the robbery charge, except the
forbidden (albeit perhaps the most illuminating) realm of character and
propensity for violent crimes.""
Head stated that a bifurcation
motion should be denied if the felon-in-possession offense "might be
material to a more serious charge" such as where "the possession charge
might conceivably become the underlying felony to support a felony
murder conviction.3 32
In Jones, the supreme court addressed the situation anticipated by the
dicta in Head, namely, a case in which the defendant seeks bifurcation
of a felon-in-possession count from murder charges. What must the
relationship of a felon-in-possession charge be to the other charges to
allow a joint trial of all the charges? The supreme court opted for the
following approach: If the facts supporting the gun possession charge
are bound up with the facts of the homicide such that the possession
charge might have served as the felony underlying a felony murder
charge, then the relationship of the charges justifies a joint trial. 333
One reason for the court's approach was that the existence of such a
factual relationship would allow the trial court to instruct the jury that
felony murder based on the possession offense is a lesser included
offense of malice murder, even where no felony murder charge based on
the possession offense is contained in the indictment. 334 The court
viewed the failure of the trial court to give such an instruction at Jones's
trial an omission that benefited defendant.33 The court's approach
appears to open the door to joint trials of murder and felon-in-possession
charges whenever the gun possession occurs during the transaction
leading to the death.
A strong dissenting opinion, joined by two justices, protested the
majority's approach..3
The dissent emphasized that the interest
advanced by Head was the interest in minimizing prejudice to defendants resulting from the admission of prior convictions that, despite
limiting instructions, may improperly be used by the jury as propensity
330. 253 Ga. 429, 431-32, 322 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1984).
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 431, 322 S.E.2d at 231.
Id. at 432, 322 S.E.2d at 232.
Jones, 265 Ga. at 139-40, 454 S.E.2d at 484-85.
Id. at 139, 454 S.E.2d at 484.
Id. at 140, 454 S.E.2d at 485.
Id. at 142-44, 454 S.E.2d at 486-88.
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evidence." 7 In the case under consideration, the State offered evidence of Jones's prior conviction for possession of cocaine in his murder
trial. 38 The dissent argued that bifurcation should occur unless the
indictment or jury instructions make the felon-in-possession charge a
predicate for a felony murder charge. 3 9 The dissent did not remark
about the majority opinion's statement that the trial court erred when
it failed to instruct the jury that felony murder based on the felony of
gun possession is a lesser included offense of malice murder, even
though that charge is not set forth in the indictment.' This directive
to trial courts may be as significant as the supreme court's holding on
bifurcation.
In Fields v. State,34 ' defendant was charged with four episodes of
kidnapping and rape as well as four counts of possessing a firearm while
committing the kidnapping and rape felonies. 42 Defendant challenged
the firearms possession counts on the ground that he had used a B-B
pistol during the abductions and that the B-B pistol is not a "firearm"
under the statute. 43 The court of appeals agreed and reversed
defendant's convictions on the firearms possession counts.3 "
In
coming to this conclusion, the court found that for purposes of the
statute in question, a "firearm" is a weapon "capable of discharging a
projectile via force of gunpowder."345 Since B-B pistols don't meet that
definition and aren't otherwise mentioned in the statute, the convictions
were reversed.'
Perhaps as interesting as the court's holding is its
discussion distinguishing cases where convictions for gun possession
during a felony have been affirmed based only on witness testimony

337.

Id. at 143, 454 S.E.2d at 487 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).

338. Id.
339. Id. at 143-44, 454 S.E.2d at 488.
340. Id. at 142-44, 454 S.E.2d at 486-88.
341. 216 Ga. App. 184, 453 S.E.2d 794 (1995).
342. Id. at 184, 453 S.E.2d at 795. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), which provides as
follows:
Any person who shall have on or within arm's reach of his person a firearm or a
knife having a blade of three or more inches in length during the commission of,
or the attempt to commit:
(1) Any crime against or involving the person of another;
... and which crime is a felony, commits a felony and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be punished by confinement for a period of five years, such sentence to run
consecutively to any other sentence which the person has received.
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b) (1996).
343. 216 Ga. App. at 184, 453 S.E.2d at 795.
344. Id. at 186-87, 453 S.E.2d at 797.
345. Id, at 187, 453 S.E.2d at 797.
346. Id.
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about the presence of a firearm. 7 In cases where no gun is recovered,
it is always possible that a witness might mistake something that is not
a firearm, like a B-B pistol, for a firearm. The court cited several cases
affirming convictions in such cases.'
The court distinguished the
case before it on the basis that the record included evidence that the
"gun" seen by the witnesses was really a B-B pistol. 49 While the
result in Fields is sound, the analysis calls into question the sufficiency
of the evidence in cases where there is not proof that the "gun" seen by
the witnesses is a working firearm. The standard seems to be that the
witnesses' testimony alone will be sufficient to support a verdict unless
there is evidence to the contrary. This standard may be viewed as
shifting the burden of proof by declaring a witness account of a "gun"
adequate unless evidence to the contrary is produced.
The defendant in Asberry v. State3" was charged with possession of
a firearm during the commission of a crime involving the possession of
a controlled substance. 51 Defendant was caught with some marijuana.352 In order to be convicted, it was necessary that defendant
possess a firearm in relation to possession of a controlled substance "as
provided in O.C.G.A. [section] 16-13-30.""
Unfortunately for the
State, section 16-13-30 distinguishes between "controlled substances"
and "marijuana."354 The court of appeals rejected the State's contention that the legislature intended that marijuana be considered a
controlled substance.35 5 Although it is possible that the legislature
intended to punish the use of a firearm during a drug offense involving
marijuana, the court's statutory construction was certainly sound and
there was no clear legislative history pointing to a different result. If it
347. Id. at 185-86, 453 S.E.2d at 795-96.
348. Id. at 185, 453 S.E.2d at 795.
349. Id. at 185-86, 453 S.E.2d at 796.
350. 220 Ga. App. 40, 467 S.E.2d 225 (1996).
351. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(4) (1996). The statute provides as follows:
Any person who shall have on or within arm's reach of his person a firearm or a
knife having a blade of three or more inches in length during the commission of,

or the attempt to commit:
... (4) Any crime involving the possession, manufacture, delivery, distribution,
dispensing, administering, selling, or possession with intent to distribute any
controlled substance as provided in Code Section 16-13-30;
*..and which crime is a felony, commits a felony and, upon conviction thereof,

shall be punished by confinement for a period of five years, such sentence to run
consecutively to any other sentence which the person has received.
Id.

352. 220 Ga. App. at 40, 467 S.E.2d at 226.
353 Id. at 41, 467 S.E.2d at 226. See O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 (1996).
354.

220 Ga. App. at 40-41, 467 S.E.2d at 226.

355. Id. at 41-42, 467 S.E.2d at 227.
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desired to do so, the legislature could easily remedy this gap in the law
by adding a reference to marijuana to the firearm possession statute.
Violation of Oath by Public Officer. In State v. Tullis,3" the
court of appeals considered the reach of the crime of violation of an oath
by a public officer. 57 Defendant was a police officer who was charged
with misdemeanor theft by shoplifting for taking a candy bar from a
convenience store without paying for it.3 The State charged defendant with violation of his oath, a felony, because he took the candy bar
while on duty. 59 The trial court dismissed the count charging violation of the officer's oath and the State appealed." ° The court of
appeals affirmed."6 The court expressed concern that any conduct by a
public officer constituting a misdemeanor would automatically be
converted into a felony by the state's interpretation of the statute.6 2
The court also noted that prior decisions require "some connection
The
between the offense and the public officer's official duties."3
court implicitly found that the commission of a misdemeanor while on
duty is not a sufficient connection to the officer's duties. This conclusion
was reinforced by the wording of the oath taken by defendant in the
case, in which the officer swears to discharge his duties as a police
officer without explicitly acknowledging a duty to uphold the laws of
Georgia." The implicit duty of police officers to uphold the law was
found by the court to be an inadequate basis for converting all misdemeanors into conduct chargeable as a felony. The court's analysis,
however, raises the question of whether the result would have been
different if the oath at issue had explicitly stated a duty to comply with
all criminal laws while on duty.
The Anti-Mask Act. In Daniels v. State,65 the supreme court had
occasion to define the mens rea needed to establish a violation of

356. 213 Ga. App. 581, 445 S.E.2d 282 (1994), cert. denied.
357. See O.C.G.A. § 16-10-I (1996). The statute states that "[any public officer who
willfully and intentionally violates the terms of his oath as prescribed by law shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five
years." Id.
358. Tullis, 213 Ga. App. at 581-82, 445 S.E.2d at 282.
359. Id. at 582, 445 S.E.2d at 283.
360. Id., 445 S.E.2d at 282.
361. Id.
362. Id., 445 S.E.2d at 283.
363. Id., 445 S.E.2d at 282-83.
364. Id.
365. 264 Ga. 460, 448 S.E.2d 185 (1994).
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Georgia's Anti-Mask Act," which makes it a misdemeanor, under
certain circumstances, to conceal one's identity by wearing a mask or
hood. The law was intended to address the problem of "intimidation and
violence against racial and religious minorities carried out by maskwearing Klansman and other 'hate' organizations.""5 7 Before the
decision in Daniels, the supreme court had limited the reach of the AntiMask Act to cases where the offender wears a mask with the intent to
conceal his or her identity and where the offender "knows or reasonably
should know that the conduct provokes a reasonable apprehension of
intimidation, threats or violence."3" The principal legal holding in
Danielswas to require either actual knowledge that the conduct resulted
869
in apprehension by the victim or reckless disregard as to that fact.
The court rejected the notion that negligence short of recklessness would
satisfy the requirements of the statute.37 Thus, the court held that
to obtain a conviction under the Anti-Mask Act, the state must show
that the mask-wearer (1) intended to conceal his identity, and (2)
either intended to threaten, intimidate, or provoke the apprehension
of violence, or acted with reckless disregard for the consequences of his
conduct or a heedless indifference to the rights and safety of others,
with reasonable foresight that injury would probably result." 1
The interpretation of the Anti-Mask statute's required mental state is
the rule of law for which Daniels stands; that rule will be significant to

366. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-38 (1996). The statute provides as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he wears a mask, hood, or device by

which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the
identity of the wearer and is upon any public way or public property or upon the
private property of another without the written permission of the owner or
occupier of the property to do so.
(b) This Code section shall not apply to:
(1) A person wearing a traditional holiday costume on the occasion of the
holiday;
(2) A person lawfully enganged in trade and employment or in a sporting
activity where a mask is worn for the purpose of ensuring the physical safety of
the wearer, or because of the nature of the occupation, trade, or profession, or
sporting activity;
(3) A person using a mask in a theatrical production including use in Mardi
Gras celebrations and masquerade balls; or
(4) A person wearing a gas mask prescribed in emergency management drills
and exercises or emergencies.
Id.

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 672, 398 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1990).
Id. at 674, 398 S.E.2d at 552.
Daniels, 264 Ga. at 464, 448 S.E.2d at 189.
Id., 448 S.E.2d at 188.
Id., 448 S.E.2d at 189.
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future prosecutions under the act. However, the unusual history of
Daniels is worthy of some comment. One aspect that stands out is the
stark contrast between the social evil in the minds of the framers of the
Anti-Mask Act and the conduct of Roy Daniels on May 24, 1992.
Daniels, who regularly searched trash cans in Athens looking for
aluminum to recycle, found a discarded football helmet and wrestling
mask.37 2 Daniels put on the mask and helmet to entertain some
children in the neighborhood.3 73 Daniels's costume apparently made
a couple of young girls look "uneasy" just as a police officer drove down
the street.374 The officer arrested Daniels and charged him with a
violation of the Anti-Mask Act. 7' The supreme court found that
Daniels's sole purpose was to entertain the children, a fact that is in
contrast with the sort of racial terrorism that was in the minds of the
authors of the Anti-Mask Act.37 One is left with the impression that
the supreme court was very uncomfortable with the application of the
Anti-Mask Act to Roy Daniels. 77 This impression is bolstered when
one considers the unusual procedural posture of the case: Daniels was
convicted in a bench trial and the supreme court took the rare step of
reversing the conviction based on insufficient evidence.3 7 The court's
route to that result was to re-interpret the statute's mens rea requirement and then to conclude that, under the newly announced standard,
no reasonable trier of fact could have convicted Daniels. 7 ' Appellate
reversal of a conviction based on application of an improper legal
standard usually results in a new trial under the proper standard; the
supreme court's willingness to engage in the necessary fact finding put
an end to the prosecution. Two of the justices on the unanimous court
may have been uncomfortable with more than Daniels's conviction;

372.

Id. at 460, 448 S.E.2d at 186.

373. Id. at 461, 448 S.E.2d at 186.
374. Id.

375. Id.
376. Id. at 463, 448 S.E.2d at 188.
377. One fact that may have heightened the court's unease with Daniels's conviction
under the Anti-Mask Act is a fact that is not mentioned in the court's opinion: Defendant
Roy Daniels is an African-American. See Daniels,264 Ga. at 460-65, 448 S.E.2d at 186-89;
Emily Heller, Court Reuerses Conviction for Violating Anti-Mask Law, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., September 26, 1994, at 1. It is left to speculation whether the symbolism of
the prosecution of an African-American man under a rarely used statute aimed primarily
at Klan activities, especially for such innocuous conduct, influenced the outcome of the
case. Also unmentioned in the court's opinion is any reference to aggravating factors, such
as prior criminal history, that may have prompted the State to pursue the prosecution.
378. 264 Ga. at 460, 464-65, 448 S.E.2d at 186, 189.
379. Id. at 463, 448 S.E.2d at 188-89.
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Justice
Carley and Chief Justice Hunt concurred in the judgment
38 0
only.

III.

A.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Investigation Phase

The Concept of Curtilage. In Espinoza v. State,8 ' the supreme
court had an opportunity to clarify the protection afforded to apartment
residents by the concept of curtilage under Georgia law.8 2 The facts
of the case read like a carefully constructed law school hypothetical: The
Espinoza brothers, Alejandro and Lorenzo, lived in the two apartments
at 251 Dickson Road in Marietta . 3 ' Lorenzo lived in Unit A and
Alejandro lived in Unit B.3 s84 Access to the two apartments was
provided by a private driveway in the shape of a stethoscope; the left
side of the stethoscope-shaped driveway led to Unit A and the right side
led to Unit B.'8 5 Law enforcement agents obtained a valid search
warrant authorizing a search of Unit B, Alejandro's apartment.3
When the search of Unit B yielded nothing, the agents searched Unit A,
which clearly was beyond the authority granted by the warrant.387
Finding nothing in Unit A, the agents searched the grounds surrounding
the apartments. 388 The agents found a garbage bag containing five
pounds of marijuana located in some bushes that were about eight feet
outside the left side of the stethoscope-shaped driveway, which led to
Unit A."89 The resident of Unit A, Lorenzo Espinoza, was indicted for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; his brother was not
charged. 3"
The trial court suppressed the marijuana on the ground that the
agents did not have a legal right to enter Unit A and that evidence

380. Id. at 465, 448 S.E.2d at 189.
381. 265 Ga. 171, 454 S.E.2d 765 (1995).
382. The decision in Espinoza was based on Georgia law, with reference to federal law
for guidance. Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, para. 13; Espinoza, 265 Ga. at 172 n.1, 454 S.E.2d at
767 n.1.
383. Espinoza, 265 Ga. at 171-73, 454 S.E.2d at 765-68.

384. Id.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id. at 173, 454 S.E.2d at
Id. at 172, 454 S.E.2d at
Id. at 171, 454 S.E.2d at
Id., 454 S.E.2d at 766.
Id. at 173, 454 S.E.2d at
Id. at 171, 454 S.E.2d at

768.
767.
767.
768.
766.
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found in the curtilage of Unit A must be suppressed.89' The court of
appeals reversed the suppression order, finding that the marijuana was
found in the "common area curtilage" of Unit B, for which the agents
had a valid warrant." The supreme court reversed, upholding the
suppression of the evidence. 39 3 The court explicitly disapproved the
use of the term "common area curtilage" to describe the area surrounding the duplex apartments .3 94 The court found that the proper test for
determining whether the marijuana was found within the curtilage of
Unit B (and therefore within the reach of the search warrant), is
whether the resident of Unit B had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the area where the contraband was found." Under this test, the
court held that the resident of Unit B "would have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a portion of the yard that was not directly
connected to that unit, its driveway, or its side of the duplex."3 Thus,
the evidence was not found within the curtilage of the apartment named
in the search warrant, and there was no authority to seize it. Three
justices, while accepting the court's legal analysis, dissented from the
factual finding as to the limits of the curtilage of Unit B and favored
remand to the trial court on that issue.3 ' Despite the odd factual
scenario involving a search warrant for one unit of the duplex and the
discovery of evidence in the curtilage of the other unit, Espinoza is a
significant development in that it clarifies the need to define the limits
of the curtilage of an apartment in light of the facts of each case
suggesting a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Consent Searches. In Ford v. State,98 the court of appeals
upheld the denial of a suppression motion in a case where defendant
Ford's sister, lessee of the apartment, consented to a search of Ford's
bedroom and cocaine was discovered therein.3 Ford claimed that he
paid rent for use of the apartment and that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his bedroom. 4" The court concluded that the

391. Id. at 171-72, 454 S.E.2d at 767.
392. State v. Espinoza, 212 Ga. App. 814, 818, 442 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1994), rev'd, 265
Ga. 171, 454 S.E.2d 765 (1995).
393. Espinoza, 265. Ga. at 174-75, 454 S.E.2d at 769.
394. Id. at 174, 454 S.E.2d at 769.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 175, 454 S.E.2d at 769.
398. 214 Ga. App. 284, 447 S.E.2d 334 (1994).
399. Id. at 284, 447 S.E.2d at 335.
400. Id.
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sister had the authority to -consent to a search of the entire apartment."° In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals deferred to
the trial court's findings that defendant had only recently moved into his
sister's apartment and that the alleged agreement about the rent, if it
existed at all, was extremely informal.' ° With respect to this conclusion, a dissenting opinion contended that Ford's payment of money to his
sister in connection with the apartment, although informal in nature,
was sufficient to elevate Ford from "guest" to "tenant."403 The majority
opinion responded that the "question is not whether a guest gives his
host money but whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
which would render unreasonablea search consented to by the host."'
Given the fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry and the requirement that
the appellate court defer to the factual findings of the trial court, the
affirmance of the denial of Ford's suppression motion was not surprising.
Of potentially greater interest is the alternative basis for affirmance
set forth by the court of appeals. Relying on the United States Supreme
Court opinion in Illinois v. Rodriguez, °5 the court found that the
evidence from Ford's bedroom was admissible because the police officers
were acting in good faith and reasonably believed the consent was
valid.40 6 Of course, the Georgia Supreme Court has rejected the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule in cases in which police officers
rely on a search warrant that is later found to lack probable cause.40 7
The rejection of the good faith exception was based on the statutorily
required exclusion of illegally seized evidence under Georgia law.408
In Ford, the majority stated that the application of the good faith
exception to warrantless consent searches is "on an entirely different
footing" from its application to cases involving search warrants.4 ° As
the dissent pointed out, this conclusion appears to be invalid in light of
the plain wording of Georgia's statutory exclusionary
rule, which applies
410
to searches conducted with or without warrants.
Sufficiency of Search Warrant Affidavit. In two interesting
cases, the court of appeals declared search warrant affidavits largely

401.

Id. at 285, 447 S.E.2d at 336.

402. Id.
403. Id. at 288-89, 447 S.E.2d at 338.
404. Id. at 286, 447 S.E.2d at 336.
405.

497 U.S. 177 (1990).

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Ford, 214 Ga. App. at 286-87, 447 S.E.2d at 336-37.
Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 577, 422 S.E.2d 426, 430 (1992).
Id. See O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 (1990).
Ford, 214 Ga. App. at 287, 447 S.E.2d at 337.
Id. at 289-90, 447 S.E.2d at 339; O.C.GA. § 17-5-30(a)(1) (1990).
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based on information from anonymous sources to be insufficient. In
Davis v. State,4 the court of appeals considered an affidavit supporting a search warrant that was based on information provided by an
anonymous "concerned citizen" to a police officer and relayed to another
officer, who was the affiant.4 1' The concerned citizen claimed to have
observed -two persons at a residence in possession of crack cocaine and
drug paraphernalia. The residence described checked out. The description of the drugs and other items seemed accurate. The officer who
interviewed the source said that the source "displayed a truthful
demeanor." Finally, one of the persons described by the source, Robert
to the affiant as a person previously convicted for
Maddox, was known
41 3
cocaine trafficking.

In assessing the sufficiency of this affidavit, the court of appeals
employed "the totality of the circumstances analysis" used in Illinois v.
Gates."4 The court found the affidavit insufficient under this test.4"'
First, the court rejected the characterization of the anonymous source as
a "concerned citizen. "4al The source had no track record and there
were no facts suggesting the source was a disinterested citizen.4 " No
facts were presented concerning the circumstances leading to the
source's provision of the information. 4 s No specific facts were set forth
to support the conclusion regarding the source's "truthful demeanor. " "
The court found that the lack of information about the source rendered
the source a mere anonymous tipster and reduced the information to the
status of rumor.4 20 The court expressed its concern that the investigating officers had failed to heed the admonition of the Georgia Supreme
Court "to make every effort to see that supporting affidavits reflect the
maximum indication of reliability."' 2'
In the end, the lack of effort by the police to strengthen the affidavit
seems to have tipped the scales against upholding the affidavit. A
dissenting opinion complained that the majority was not applying the
totality of the circumstances approach.4 22 To the dissent, "a practical,
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common-sense analysis indicated that there was a fair probability that
contraband would be found in the residence."42 ' The dissent contended
that the source's accurate and detailed description of the drugs, the
paraphernalia, and the residence, combined with the naming of a suspect
with a prior cocaine conviction, was enough.424
Wood v. State421 involved the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit relying on information provided by an unidentified person to a
reliable police informant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress,
finding that the warrant established probable cause.426 The affidavit
supporting the warrant was based on these facts: The unidentified
person told the reliable informant that he had seen illegal drugs at
Wood's home. 427 The reliable informant passed this information on to
the police, telling the police that the unidentified person did not know
that the police would be informed.4" The only steps taken by the
police to corroborate the information from the unidentified person was
to confirm Wood's address, the make of her car, and her hair color.429
That was it. The unidentified person had no track record of providing
reliable information.4 "0 The reliable informant had no independent
knowledge of the presence of drugs in Wood's home.43 1
This information supporting the warrant in Wood lacks the detail and
weight of the information that failed to pass muster in Davis. Not
surprisingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred when it
denied Wood's motion to suppress.4 2 The potentially significant
portion of the court's reasoning in Wood, as in Davis, is the court's focus
on the failure of the police to take additional investigative steps to
corroborate the unidentified person's information.43 By suppressing
the evidence in cases like Wood and Davis, the court is sending a clear
message: The police must make more of an effort to check out the
information.
The dissent in Wood took issue with the criticism of the efforts by the
police.4 ' The dissent contended that the police had done everything
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they could to check the information without risking alerting Wood by,
perhaps, having the reliable informant seek additional information from
the unwitting unidentified person.8 5 The dissent concluded, as in
Davis, that under the totality of the circumstances, there was a fair
probability the contraband would be found in Wood's house.436 The
majority's emphasis on the failure of the police to take additional steps
to check the information, without citing any specific steps that should
have been taken,43 7 suggests that the court was troubled, in part, by
a perceived lack of effort.
Both Wood and Davis should serve notice on the police that avenues
for obtaining corroboration should be pursued. Search warrant affiants
also might consider including an account of investigative steps considered and rejected as impractical or risky. A brief discussion of the lack
of viable avenues for further investigation might allay the court's
apparent concern that the police were not trying to fortify the information available but instead were presenting whatever was at hand. A
showing by the affiant that effort was made to augment the information
available, even if unsuccessful, might affect the court's application of the
expansive totality of the circumstances test.
Another development that will affect litigation over the sufficiency of
search warrant affidavits is the supreme court's decision in a case
entitled Davis v. State.438 In that case, the court clarified the law
concerning which party has the burden of proof when a challenge is
made to a warrant. The court disapproved language suggesting that the
challenger of a search warrant has the burden of proof.439 The court
concluded, "[tihus, under Georgia law, the challenger of a search warrant
does not have the burden of proving its invalidity. Once a motion to
suppress has been filed, the burden of proving the lawfulness
of the
0
warrant is on the state and that burden never shifts.""
Investigatory Stops. There were several interesting decisions
concerning the propriety of investigatory stops by the police, or so-called
"Terry stops.""1 The general rule is that police may make brief
investigatory stops of persons but that the stops must be justified by
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
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inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."' 2
Thus, the police must have a reasonable suspicion"that criminal activity
may be
afoot" before briefly seizing persons for the purpose of investiga3
44

tion.

These general principles have been applied to stops of vehicles, and
several cases from the survey period involved investigatory stops of
vehicles. In Vansant v. State, 4 the supreme court upheld a suppression of evidence because the police had an insufficient basis for stopping
a vehicle. The court conducted a de novo review' on these uncontested facts: At a little after one in the morning on March 8, 1993, police
received a call from a person who had seen Vansant, who appeared to be
intoxicated, get into a white General Motors van, back into another
vehicle, and drive away.446 The caller identified himself to police,
provided Vansant's name, described the color and manufacturer of the
van, and indicated the direction the van was traveling." 7 The police
officer responding to the call, however, only knew two facts: that a hit
and run recently had occurred in the vicinity and that the suspect was
in a white van.4 Among the few vehicles on the road at that hour,
the officer spotted a white van on a main road leading from the scene of
the accident." 9 The officer was then provided with Vansant's name,
but the officer did not know him and did not check the van's licence
plate number.40'
Although the officer saw no traffic violations or
damage to the white van, the officer stopped the van.45 ' Indeed, the
record reflected that the officer "would have stopped any white van he
had seen in the area because of the proximity to the incident location."'52 The officer's observation of the van's driver after the stop lead
him to conclude that Vansant was intoxicated.4 53
Vansant was
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. 4
The court concluded that "the detaining officer did not have the
requisite particularized basis for suspecting the driver of this particular
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white van of criminal activity."' 5 The court found that the information possessed by the officer, which was limited to the recent, nearby
occurrence of a hit and run involving a white van, was inadequate to
allow a stop of the vehicle.4" Three dissenting justices disagreed. The
dissent contended that the description of a white van, the proximity in
time and space to the accident, the lack of traffic, and the van's presence
on a road leading from the scene were sufficient to justify the stop.457
Obviously, this was a close case. Once again, the lesson is that the
police need to try to get the extra fact that will tip the scales decidedly,
such as by checking Vansant's vehicle registration. However, the press
of time on the police officer often will not allow for the reflection or
investigation to obtain that extra fact.
The court of appeals also decided several cases in which the police
were without the facts needed to justify the stop of a vehicle. Streicher
v. State4" involved a stop of a pick-up truck with a driver and a
passenger after a policeman on patrol saw the pick-up come to a stop on
the road, after which the passenger got out and walked around the back
of the truck to the driver's door while the driver slid over to the
passenger's seat.459 The police officer observed that while the original
passenger walked around the truck, he got a startled look on his face
when he saw the officer.4 After the two men switched drivers, the
truck turned onto a different road.481 The policeman pulled over the
pick-up and both men were charged with crimes for driving on suspended licenses, not having insurance, and possession of a small quantity of
marijuana.4"2
The trial court denied defendants' motion to suppress the evidence. 4"
The trial court based its ruling on the fact that defendants' "unusual
behavior" of stopping to switch drivers, although apparently not
The court of appeals
criminal, aroused the police officer's suspicions.

455. Id. at 321, 443 S.E.2d at 476.
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457. Id. at 322, 443 S.E.2d at 477 (Hunstein, J., dissenting in part).
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he said it was marked. Id. at 671, 445 S.E.2d at 816. It is possible that the officer was
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The court focused on
reversed, holding that the stop was invalid.'
the officer's testimony that he was going to stop "to find out why they
stopped there in the middle of the road while they changed drivers."'
The court found this reason for stopping the pick-up inadequate, and
concluded that the stop was based on a hunch rather than particular
facts giving rise to an inference of criminal activity. 1 7 It is interesting
that the court rejected the State's argument that the stop was justified
because defendants' conduct violated several laws that forbid stopping
on the roadway, crimes defendants were charged with after they filed
their motions to suppress.4" The court dismissed this argument
because the police officer did not articulate stopping on the roadway as
a reason for stopping the pick-up." 9 Thus, defendants' commission of
crimes that the officer did not have in mind could not justify the stop.
State v. Jones470 provides a different twist on the same theme. In
Jones, the police officer stopped defendant when defendant excecuted a
U-turn without signalling.47 1 Defendant was charged with driving
under the influence and turning without a signal.472 The trial court
found the stop unjustified because defendant's failure to signal was not
a crime under Georgia law, which does not require a signal if no other
drivers are on the road.47 The court of appeals rejected the State's
contention that the subsequent determination that the signal was not
required should not invalidate the stop.474 The State's position was
really a good faith argument: If the police officer mistakenly, but in
good faith, believes that conduct may violate a state law, the officer's
legal mistake should not cause suppression of evidence from a stop based
on that mistaken belief. The court of appeals held that the criminal
activity justifying a stop must really be criminal activity.47 Thus, the
court in Streicher says that only real criminal activity, not merely
criminal activity in the mind of the police, will justify a stop, and the
court in Jones says that the criminal activity in the mind of the police
must be real to justify a stop.
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The court of appeals also decided some cases where Terry stops were
based on anonymous tips. The following three cases, in which the court
suppressed evidence, are instructive. In VonLinsowe v. State,4" 8 the
police received an anonymous call in which the caller claimed to have
witnessed a drug deal. The caller gave a description of the car used by
one of the parties to the drug deal, including the license plate number,
and further stated that there were drugs in the car.477 The caller also
indicated the route of the car and that the driver was a white female.478 A police car waited on the route and followed the car when
it passed." 9 When the car parked at a shopping center and the driver
got out, the police officer approached her and requested indentification.48 0 The police officer asked for consent to search the car, and the
driver refused.4"' The officer then told the driver that she would be
detained while another law enforcement officer came to the shopping
center.482 The driver later consented to the search, but only after the
police told her that the refusal to consent would mean a longer time in
custody while a search warrant was obtained.4 Drugs were found in
the car.4 The court of appeals held that, while the initial encounter
was lawful, the police did not have a basis for detaining the driver.488
This meant that the consent to search, even if voluntary, was tainted by
the illegal detention.4" The court emphasized that the anonymous tip
was uncorroborated and did not contain information not available to the
general public.48 7
McKinley v. State4s is similar. In that case, police received an
anonymous tip that four black males in a white Chevrolet Lumina van
with Florida plates from Hillsborough County were selling drugs on a
certain street."9 Police spotted the van in the vicinity described and
approached the two men riding in the van. 4 ° The driver produced a
driver's license and a rental agreement for the van which did not name
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

213 Ga. App. 619, 445 S.E.2d 371 (1994).
Id. at 619, 445 S.E.2d at 371.
Id.
Id. at 620, 445 S.E.2d at 371-72.
Id., 445 S.E.2d at 372.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 622, 445 S.E.2d at 373.
Id. at 619-20, 445 S.E.2d at 371.
Id. at 621, 445 S.E.2d at 373.
Id. at 622-23, 445 S.E.2d at 373.
Id. at 621, 445 S.E.2d at 372.
213 Ga. App. 738, 445 S.E.2d 828 (1994).
Id. at 738, 445 S.E.2d at 829.
Id., 445 S.E.2d at 829-30.

272

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

him as the renter or additional driver.49 1 The police asked whether
there were drugs in the van and the driver said no.492 The driver then
consented to a search of the van.49 The officers found cocaine in the
van.4 The court of appeals rejected the notion that the two men were
not seized, finding that neither was free to leave.495 The court also
concluded that the police lacked sufficient reasons to detain the
men."' The uncorroborated tip was insufficient to justify the stop and
the consent search was therefore tainted.497
An unknown tipster also played a role in State v. Sapp.4 98 The
police received a report from an unidentified person that "some guys,"
described as "young black males," were selling drugs at a location known
for such activity.499 When the police arrived at the location, Sapp, who
is a young black male, acted suspiciously by apparently starting to run
and then stopping and returning. 500 The police asked for Sapp's
identity and one police officer recognized Sapp as having a prior
record. °1 At that point, the police directed Sapp to put his hands on
a wall and police did a pat-down search that yielded a crack pipe found
in Sapp's back pocket."0 2 After the police discovered the pipe, Sapp
admitted that he was on probation and made several very incriminating
statements, such as stating that he was a "crack head.""03 The police
took Sapp to jail, where he tested positive for cocaine. 4 On these
facts, the trial court suppressed the evidence obtained from the
encounter with Sapp, and the court of appeals affirmed. 0 5 First, the
court of appeals found that the initial stop was invalid, "not being
grounded on a legitimate articulable suspicion."5' Second, the court
found that the pat-down search leading to the discovery of the crack pipe
exceeded the scope of the limited search for weapons allowed under
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Terry.5"7 Third, the court suggested that the evidence from the drug
test given to Sapp would also be tainted if the police did not discover
that he was on probation until after the illegal investigative stop had
test
The record was unclear on whether the drug
commenced.'
50 9
should be suppressed, thus the case was remanded on this issue.
State v. Crisanti1 0 involved an investigatory stop in another context.
In that case, Crisanti and two companions named Dubnoff and Rivera
purchased airline tickets for a flight from Brunswick, Georgia to San
Francisco, with a stop in Atlanta.5 ' As the men went through security
in Brunswick, employees noticed that one of the men was carrying an
electronic device in a briefcase. 12 The man with the briefcase stated
that the device was for carrying jewelry and that it had an alarm that
could be operated by remote control.51 In a separate carry-on bag in
the possession of one of the other men, an employee saw a large sum of
currency and a jar containing white powder, which the man said was
powdered caffeine.514 The trio eventually were allowed to pass through
security, but upon second thought, the employees reported to other
airport officials concerning what they had seen.5 15 By this time, the
control advised Atlanta
flight from Brunswick was in the air, so flight
516
situation.
the
about
officials
enforcement
law
When the flight landed in Atlanta, officers and agents were on the
tarmac to meet the plane. 17 When the men got off the plane, the
agents approached and identified themselves. 1 ' Crisanti made several
statements: He acknowledged that the briefcase, which was in Rivera's
possession, contained an electronic device."1 9 Crisanti explained that
the device, which could emit an electronic shock, was a security device
for transporting jewelry and it was operated by remote control. 20 He
also said that the men were in the jewelry business and that was why
they were carrying lots of cash.52' When Crisanti said he did not know
507.
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where the remote control was, an agent patted him down, finding
$10,000 in cash, but no remote control. 522 The agents declined Crisanti's offer to open the briefcase because they feared an explosive device of
some sort. 523 One agent asked Crisanti if he would consent to the
search of the briefcase and his carry-on bag and Crisanti answered, "[no
problem." 24 The agents ordered Rivera to put down the briefcase and
told him he was being detained while the briefcase was examined. 5"
An agent, searching for the remote control, patted down Rivera; when
the agent felt a rectangular object in Rivera's pocket, the agent
handcuffed Rivera.526 Meanwhile, another agent searched Dubnoff and
found a crack pipe with drug residue.5 27 Dubnoff was arrested and,
along with his two companions, taken to the airport police department,
where the agents intended to look for the remote control.5"
At the police department, an agent asked Crisanti for permission to
search his carry-on bag.5 29

Crisanti gave his consent.5 30 In the bag,

the agent found a pair of electronic scales with white powdery residue,
a woman's make-up compact with white residue, and a pill bottle with
white powder in it.53' One of the agents eventually decided to open the
briefcase and found the remote control.5 2
Before trial, Crisanti moved to suppress the currency found during the
pat-down on the tarmac and the items found in his carry-on bag at the
police station. 3 The trial court denied the motion to suppress the
currency on the ground that the pat-down occurred during a valid
investigatory stop. 534 The trial court granted the motion to suppress
the contents of the bag on the ground that Crisanti was arrested without
probable cause at the time the bag was searched.3 5 The court of
appeals reversed the trial court's order suppressing the contents of the
carry-on bag.53 The court cited two reasons. The first was that the
agents' removal of Crisanti from the tarmac to the police station was
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reasonable and was a valid investigatory stop."3 7 The court based this
conclusion on the unusual circumstances confronting the agents and the
38
high stakes involved in the work of maintaining airport security.1
The court noted the need for the agents to find and check the remote
control device: "To reasonably carry out their investigation, these
officers had to carefully and cautiously search until they found this
remote device."139 Given the suspicious circumstances, including the
presence of an electrical device which was said to be capable of shocking
a person, the court concluded that removing Crisanti to the police station
was reasonable.' The removal to the station was not only reasonable
as a step in the investigation, but was justified by safety concerns."'
The second reason given by the court concerned testimony at the
suppression hearing that Crisanti had consented to the search of his
carry-on bag while still on the tarmac."' 2 The trial court apparently
discounted this testimony, but the court of appeals found it to be very
important. The court of appeals reasoned that if Crisanti consented to
the search while still on the tarmac, the search of the bag was valid even
if the removal from the tarmac was beyond the bounds of a legal
investigatory stop. 43 Interestingly, the court also suggested that the
consent Crisanti, like all air travelers, gave to search his bags before
boarding extended to his arrival in Atlanta. 544 The court stated that
"once Crisanti presented himself at airport security in Brunswick and
allowed agents to search his carry-on bag, he could not withdraw that
consent until authorities were satisfied he posed no security risk." 45
In its discussion, the court did not explicitly make one other point that
flows from its reasoning: If the removal of Crisanti was a valid
investigatory stop, Crisanti's second consent to search, given at the
police station, was valid.
The position of the dissenting judges was certainly reasonable. The
key to the dissent's analysis was that the "time and scope" of the
investigatory stop was not "sufficiently limited."5 46 The dissent pointed
out that more questioning and investigation on the tarmac may have
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been sufficient." 7 - Why had the agents not allowed Crisanti to open
the briefcase when he offered? Why did the agents not use a drug
sniffing dog? Why was Rivera, who was carrying the briefcase, not
asked about the remote control? In short, the dissent found that the
investigatory stop was not minimally intrusive and exceeded the length
of time necessary to fulfill the purpose of the stop.' As for the issue
of Crisanti's consent to search, the dissent said that Crisanti had been
arrested without probable cause, resulting in a taint on his consent at
the police station. 49 The dissent expressed concern that the court of
appeals was not deferring to the trial court's finding that the evidence
did not show that Crisanti had consented while on the tarmac.550
Furthermore, the dissent argued, even if Crisanti had consented, the
agents' failure to act promptly negated the consent.55' Although the
dissent did not specifically address the majority's broad theory of consent
based on a passenger's initial security check, the dissent's position on
the lapsing of Crisanti's consent on the tarmac, if correct, would refute
the majority on that point.
Pretextual Arrest. May the police make an arrest of a suspect,
supported by probable cause, when the police would not have made the
arrest but for a desire to gather evidence of another crime? In Ortiz v.
State5 2 the supreme court was confronted with that question. Police
received reports that Ortiz was looking into a woman's window, but did
not pursue the matter because the woman was reluctant to be involved.5"' However, the police pursued the peeping tom charge when
Ortiz became a suspect in a rape investigation; the police admitted that
but for the rape investigation they would not have charged Ortiz with
being a peeping tom.'" When police arrested Ortiz on the peeping
tom charge, they took blood, hair, and saliva samples as part of the rape
investigation.5 5 After the rape victim identified a photo of Ortiz as
her attacker, police obtained a warrant to search Ortiz's home and found
additional evidence to support the rape charge, of which Ortiz eventually
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was convicted.5 5 The majority opinion, in somewhat cryptic language,
declared that Ortiz's arrest was not pretextual.557
Justice Sears dissented. She contended that the arrest on the peeping
torn charge clearly was pretextual inasmuch as the police admitted that
the arrest would not have occurred but for the rape investigation.5 58
Citing a prior decision declaring a pretextual 'investigatory stop
impermissible, Justice Sears reasoned that a pretextual arrest is
similarly impermissible."5 9 Although Justice Sears's dissent has some
logical force, four days after the court issued its opinion in Ortiz, the
United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Whren v. United
States,' rejecting the position that a traffic stop based on probable
cause could be rendered invalid because it was pretextual. In Whren,
the Supreme Court stated that it would not countenance complex
inquiries into the motivations behind police conduct where the actions
are based on probable cause: "Subjective intentions play no role in
While
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.""'
law,
the
of
state
a
matter
rule
as
different
a
to
embrace
is
free
Georgia
to
happen.
likely
is
that
suggest
does
not
decision in Ortiz
Warrantless Arrests in the Home.
supreme court held:

In Carranza v.State,56 2 the

[Wihere an individual commits an offense in his or her home and that
offense is committed "in [the] presence or within [the] immediate
knowledge" of a law enforcement officer, the officer is authorized to
arrest the individual in the home without a warrant only where the
officer's entry into the home is by consent or where there are exigent
circumstances. Absent exigent circumstances or consent, a neutral
officer must be allowed to assess whether the police have probable
cause to make an arrest in the home.'
This holding resolved an important issue in Georgia. By statute,
Georgia authorizes warrantless arrests for crimes where the offense is
committed in the presence or immediate knowledge of the police,"'
which has been interpreted to include cases where the police overhear

556.
557.

266 Ga. at 755-56, 470 S.E.2d at 877.
Id. at 753, 470 S.E.2d at 875.

558. Id. at 757, 470 S.E.2d at 878 (Sears, J., dissenting).
559. Id. at 756, 470 S.E.2d at 877 (Sears, J., dissenting). See United States v. Smith,
799 F.2d 704, 710-11 (11th Cir. 1986).
560. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
561. Id at 1771.
562. 266 Ga. 263, 467 S.E.2d 315 (1996).
563. Id. at 268, 467 S.E.2d at 318-19.
564. O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a) (1990).
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a crime through a listening device concealed by an informant.5 65 That
is exactly what had happened in the investigation leading to Carranza's
arrest.
The unresolved issue was whether, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, the police may make a warrantless arrest in the suspect's
home pursuant to the authority to make a warrantless arrest upon
overhearing the commission of a crime in the home. The holding in
Carranza,which is based on the special protections afforded a person's
home, stands for the proposition that whenever circumstances permit,
the state should be required to obtain a warrant so that a neutral judge
may evaluate the basis for entering the home.
Good Faith Errors and the Exclusionary Rule. In 1984, the
United States Supreme Court recognized a "good faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule.56 7 Under the good faith exception, evidence seized
by police conducting a search pursuant to a warrant issued by a
magistrate may be admitted at trial despite a later finding by a
reviewing court that the warrant was not supported by probable
cause.5 The theory behind this exception is that as long as the police
are relying in good faith and their reliance is objectively reasonable, the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served by the exclusion
of the evidence.56 The exception is also rooted in the notion that the
exclusionary rule is not aimed at modifying the behavior of magistrates,
as long as they maintain their neutral, detached status."' The
Supreme Court recently applied the good faith exception to a case where
a police officer arrested the defendant based on a warrant that appeared
on a computer check, but turned out to have been previously
quashed.571 In that case, the Court concluded that the error, which
had been made by a court clerk, did not require exclusion of evidence
found in the search incident to arrest because the police officer had
relied in good faith on the erroneous computer check.57
Several years ago in Gary v. State, 73 the Georgia Supreme Court
declined to adopt the good faith exception, holding that Georgia's

565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.

266 Ga. at 265-66, 467 S.E.2d at 317.
Id. at 263-64, 467 S.E.2d at 316.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Id. at 913.
Id. at 918-19.
Id. at 916-17.
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
Id. at 1194.

573. 262 Ga. 573, 422 S.E.2d 426 (1992).
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statutory exclusionary rule,574 by its terms, recognizes no exception.
After the supreme court's recent opinion in Harvey v. State,575 it is
appropriate to ask the following question about Georgia's recognition of
the good faith exception: Does she or doesn't she? In Harvey, a police
officer arrested defendant when a computer check showed an outstand-

ing warrant.5 76 In the search incident to arrest, the police discovered
cocaine.577 It turned out the computer check was wrong; in fact, the
bench warrant had been recalled four days before the arrest.5 7
evidence on the ground that it was seized
Harvey moved to suppress 5the
79
during an unlawful arrest.
The supreme court's opinion began by reaffirming its prior holding:
The court also
Georgia does not recognize the good faith exception."
noted that it was undisputed that Harvey was "not lawfully arrested
pursuant to the bench warrant itself, since that bench warrant had been
recalled several days before Harvey was arrested."5 8' These opening
points by the court seem to pre-ordain the outcome. However, in what
can only be called highly questionable logic, the court concluded that the
police officer had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest: "Thus,
Harvey's arrest was lawful since the evidence shows that the officer was

574.

O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 (1990). The statute provides as follows:

(a) A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the court
for the return of property, the possession of which is not otherwise unlawful, and
to suppress as evidence anything so obtained on the grounds that:
(1) The search and seizure without a warrant was illegal; or
(2) The search and seizure with a warrant was illegal because the warrant is
insufficient on its face, there was not probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant, or the warrant was illegally executed.
(b) The motion shall be in writing and state facts showing that the search and
seizure were unlawful. The judge shall receive evidence out of the presence of the
jury on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion; and the burden of
proving that the search and seizure were lawful shall be on the state. If the
motion is granted the propery shall be restored, unless otherwise subject to lawful
detention, and it shall not be admissible in evidence against the movant in any
trial.
(c) The motion shall be made only before a court with jurisdiction to try the
offense. If a criminal accusation is filed or if an indictment or special presentment
is returned by a grand jury, the motion shall be made only before the court in
which the accusation, indictment, or special presentment is filed and pending.
Id.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.

266 Ga. 671, 469 S.E.2d 176 (1996).
Id. at 671, 469 S.E.2d at 177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672, 469 S.E.2d at 178.
Id.
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acting on reliable information that there was an outstanding felony
warrant against Harvey." 2 Of course, the information was not
"reliable," and the court later referred to the computer check as
"misinformation."5 s Also, the court does not suggest that the arresting
officer knew anything about the conduct that led to the issuance of the
bench warrant. The only information the officer had was the erroneous
report that there was an outstanding warrant." 4 The court's analysis
sounds a lot like the analysis supporting the good faith exception, but
the court's opinion insisted that the good faith exception "is not
implicated by this case."585
Three justices dissented. In short, the dissenters accused the majority
of overruling its prior ruling in Gary sub silentio.58 6 The dissenters
stated:
[T]he majority opinion, in its effort to avoid the effect of binding
precedent without facing up to the necessity of overruling it, indulges
in circular reasoning: the arrest pursuant to the warrant was invalid,
but the search is valid if there was probable cause to arrest, and the
warrant provided that probable cause. What the majority opinion
asserts, in plain language, is that the warrant, although entirely
invalid, provided sufficient probable cause to arrest.8 7
The dissenters' argument is compelling. After Harvey, the status of the
good faith exception in Georgia is uncertain. Does she or doesn't she?
Interrogation: Right to Counsel. Under Miranda v. Arizona..
and Edwards v. Arizona,'8 9 police must terminate the interview of a
suspect once the suspect invokes the right to counsel, and may not reinterview the suspect or initiate contacts for the purpose of obtaining
incriminating statements. In Wilson v. State,5" the Supreme Court of
Georgia was confronted with the following situation: Wilson was
convicted of murder, robbery, and kidnapping.5"' At his trial, the State
introduced incriminating statements made by Wilson to a fellow inmate
while incarcerated on an unrelated offense."s Wilson's fellow inmate

582. Id. at 673, 469 S.E.2d at 179.

583. Id.
584.
585.
586.
587.

588.
589.
590.
591.
592.

Id.
Id. at 674, 469 S.E.2d at 179.
Id. at 675, 469 S.E.2d at 180 (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
264 Ga. 287, 444 S.E.2d 306 (1994).
Id. at 287, 444 S.E.2d at 308.
Id. at 288, 444 S.E.2d at 308.
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engaged Wilson in conversation at the request of state authorities. 593
By itself, the use of a jailhouse informant is unremarkable because it is
settled that state authorities may initiate indirect contact with a suspect
through a fellow inmate without giving Miranda rights to the suspect. 94 The issue concerning the use of the jailhouse informant in
Wilson was whether the State violated the suspect's right to counsel by
initiating the jailhouse contacts after the suspect had invoked his right
to counsel.595 In fact, Wilson had been interviewed by police on four
occasions before the jailhouse contacts were initiated.5 96 At each
interview, Wilson was read his Miranda rights. 97 During the third
interview, which occurred seven months before the jailhouse contacts,
The
Wilson invoked his right to counsel, ending the interview.59
fourth interview took place at a state prison where Wilson was being
That interview ended when Wilson,
held on unrelated charges."'
without explicitly invoking his right to counsel, told police he did not
Within days, state officials transfered Wilson to a
want to talk.'
different prison, placing him in a cell next to the inmate who served as
the informant. °1
The supreme court upheld the admission of Wilson's statements to the
jailhouse informant. The court relied on the precedents holding that
police may initiate contact after the invocation of the right to counsel
where there is a "break in custody."60 ' The court stated:
Because of the absence or dissipation of coercion once a suspect is
released from custody, subsequent confessions obtained from even
police initiated interrogation are admissible without violating the
suspect's fifth amendment rights if there has been an intervening
In the instant case, there was a seven-month
break in custody ....
break in custody between [the third] interrogation when Wilson
invoked his right to counsel and the time Wilson made the incriminating statements to [the informant] and Wilson did not reassert his right
to counsel at the [fourth] interrogation.6 3

593. Id.
594. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).

595. 264 Ga. at 288, 444 S.E.2d at 308.
596. Id. at 287-88, 444 S.E.2d at 308.

597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.

Id.
Id. at 288, 444 S.E.2d at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 289, 444 S.E.2d at 309.

603. Id. at 289-90, 444 S.E.2d at 309 (citations omitted).
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In a footnote, the court noted that there was no evidence that "Wilson's
release from custody," presumably referring to the termination of the
third interview at which Wilson invoked his right to counsel, was a ploy
to later seek a waiver of Wilson's rights.'
The application of the "break in custody" exception in cases involving
indirect contact by jailhouse informants is problematic. The court
applied the "break in custody" exception to the subsequent statements
made to a jailhouse informant despite the fact that no Miranda
warnings are required during the undercover contacts. This is because
questioning by a fellow inmate is not classified as "custodial interrogation.' 0 5 Wilson's case is different from the major precedent on the
"break in custody" exception relied upon by the court, State v.Bymes,60 6 in which the suspect was read his Miranda rights before the
second interview following a twenty-one month break in custody.607
The court could have simply relied on the cases holding that questioning
by a jailhouse informant is not custodial interrogation, a point raised by
Justice Carley in his concurrence in Wilson.' Perhaps the court was
reluctant to rely on a characterization of the state's actions as noncustodial interrogation, since the state used its custodial control of Wilson to
bring him in contact with the informant. In any event, the "break in
custody" theory seems most appropriate where police give Miranda
warnings after initiating a re-interview of a suspect who previously
invoked his right to counsel.
It can also be questioned whether the state's orchestrated secret
contacts with Wilson amounted to the state doing indirectly what it is
forbidden to do directly. Wilson had invoked his right to counsel. The
state was forbidden to re-interview him unless, after a break in custody,
he again was advised of his rights and waived them. The state then
arranged for Wilson to come into contact with an informant who elicited
statements on behalf of the state without the requirement of advising
Wilson of his rights and obtaining a waiver. In discussing the "break in
custody" exception, the court noted that Wilson's "release" from the third
interview was not a "ploy" to set up another attempt to get him to waive
his rights. 0 9 The troubling aspect of the result in Wilson is that the
state's use of the informant allowed them to initiate contact with a

604. Id. at 290 n.3, 444 S.E.2d at 309 n.3; see also id. at 291,444 S.E.2d at 310 (Carley,
J., concurring specially).
605. Id. at 291-92, 444 S.E.2d at 311 (Carley, J., concurring specially).
606. 258 Ga. 813, 375 S.E.2d 41 (1989).
607. Id. at 814, 375 S.E.2d at 41.
608. 264 Ga. at 291-92, 444 S.E.2d at 311.
609. Id. at 290 n.3, 444 S.E.2d at 309 n.3.
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suspect who had invoked his right to counsel and to do so without readvising him of his rights. This seems to be the kind of ploy to end-run
the suspect's rights that the court often rejects.
Another case involving interrogation in the absence of counsel was
610 That case involved the police practice of presentState v. Hatcher.
ing arrestees with a form on which they can request court-appointed
counsel.6 11 The question was whether requesting appointed counsel on
the form amounted to an invocation of the right to counsel, thereby
preventing questioning by the police in the absence of counsel.61 In
Hatcher,the defendant completed the pre-printed form, thereby adopting
a statement on the form: "I CANNOT afford a lawyer to assist me. I DO
WANT the Court to provide me with a lawyer."6 1 ' Two days later, the
61 4
police interviewed Hatcher after advising him of his Miranda rights.
Hatcher confessed to burglary during the interview. 65 The court held
that the form was not an invocation of rights, but was "a housekeeping
measure" to screen applicants for financial eligibility and a "prospective
request for counsel" when court proceedings began and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached.616
B. Litigation Phase
Pretrial Proceedings: Press Coverage. In Southeastern Newspapers Corp. v. Georgia,617 the supreme court approved a trial court's
order closing most pretrial proceedings in a capital murder case. The
trial court found that pretrial publicity threatened the fairness of the
trial because prejudicial matters might be disclosed to potential
jurors.61 s

The supreme court applied the applicable standard under

Georgia law, which states that proceedings shall be open to the press
unless the defendant or other movant is able to demonstrate on the
record by "clear and convincing proof" that closing the hearing to the
press and public is the only means by which a "clear and present

610. 264 Ga. 556, 448 S.E.2d 698 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1405 (1995).

611. 264 Ga. at 556, 448 S.E.2d at 698.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.

Id. at 557-58, 448 S.E.2d at 699.
Id. at 556, 448 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 557, 448 S.E.2d at 699.
Id.
Id. at 558, 448 S.E.2d at 699.
265 Ga. 223, 454 S.E.2d 452 (1995),
Id. at 223, 454 S.E.2d at 453.
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danger" to his right to a fair trial or other asserted right can be
avoided. 19
The court noted that the burden on a movant is less at the pretrial
phase because of the lack of certain alternatives to reduce the effect of
publicity, such as sequestration of jurors,6 20 Without much discussion,
the majority concluded that the record in the trial court established clear
and convincing proof that closing pretrial proceedings was the only way
to ensure a fair trial. 2'
Three justices joined in a sharp dissent. 22 The essence of the
dissenters' position was that the pretrial publicity leading to the trial
court's order was insufficient to warrant limiting public access to the
proceedings. 62' The dissenters pointed out that the trial court's order
was issued because of two newspaper articles reporting on the prior
day's proceedings in the case, neither of which contained inaccurate or
highly prejudicial information. 24 The dissent contrasted the situation
faced by the trial court with other high profile cases, including the O.J.
Simpson case. 625 The dissent made a persuasive case that the evidence
was insufficient to warrant closure of the proceedings. The majority's
analysis would appear to apply to almost any case receiving moderate
coverage by the press. Perhaps the majority decision is a sign of the
increasing concern over the effects of the "media circus" surrounding the
Simpson case.
Discovery. The supreme court modified the law concerning what
scientific reports must be turned over to the state by the defense in
Rower v. State.62 6 The prosecution is required by statute to provide
the defense with scientific reports "which will be introduced in whole or
in part against the defendant by the prosecution in its case-in-chief or
in rebuttal."' 27 Although the statute puts no discovery obligation on8
62
the defense, the supreme court created such a duty in Sabel v. State.
However, the language in Sabel and other decisions appeared to create
a greater discovery obligation on the defense than the state's obligation

619. R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 579, 292 S.E.2d 815, 819 (1982).
620. 265 Ga. at 223, 454 S.E.2d at 453.
621. Id. at 223-24, 454 S.E.2d at 453.
622, Id. at 224-28, 454 S.E.2d at 453-56.

623. Id.
624. Id. at 225-26, 454 S.E.2d at 454-55.
625. Id. at 226, 454 S.E.2d at 455.
626. 264 Ga. 323, 443 S.E.2d 839 (1994).
627. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-211(b) (1990).

628. 248 Ga. 10, 282 S.E.2d 61, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 973 (1981).
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under the statute. 2 9 For example, the defense in Rower was ordered
to turn over information without reference to whether the expert's
testimony would be introduced.' 3 The supreme court decision in
Rower remedied this situation, holding that the obligations of the state
and defense would be reciprocal and limited to those defined in the
statute governing discovery by the state."'
Speedy Trial. During the survey period, the supreme court resolved
several issues concerning the speedy trial rights of a criminal defendant.
Under Georgia's statutory speedy trial scheme, defendants who file a
demand for a speedy trial must be tried within a certain number of court
terms or they are entitled to acquittal. In capital cases, a defendant
must be acquitted if he demands trial and is not tried within the first
two regular terms of court that are convened after the term in which the
demand is filed, if juries were impaneled and qualified and the
defendant is present and ready for trial. 2 In noncapital cases the
rule is similar, except that the trial must occur in the term during which
the demand is made or the next court term. 3 Inherent in such a
statutory scheme are many difficult questions concerning compliance
with the time requirements, such as deciding when the "speedy trial
clock" begins to run and when it will be deemed to stop and restart.
Two such issues were resolved in Henry v. James."4 The first
question in Henry was this: In a case where a defendant files a demand

629. 264 Ga. at 325, 443 S.E.2d at 842.
630. Id. at 324, 443 S.E.2d at 841.
631. Id. at 325, 443 S.E.2d at 841-42.
632. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-173(b) (1990). The statute provides as follows:
If more than two regular terms of court are convened and adjourned after the
term at which the demand is filed and the defendant is not given a trial, then he
shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the
indictment, provided that at both terms there were juries impaneled and qualified
to try the defendant and provided, further, that the defendant was present in
court announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial on the indictment.

Id.
633. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170(b) (1990). The statute provides as follows:
If the person is not tried when the demand is made or at the next succeeding
regular court term thereafter, provided at both court terms there were juries
impaneled and qualified to try him, he shall be absolutely discharged and

acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation. For purposes of
computing the term at which a misdemeanor must be tried under this Code
section, there shall be excluded any civil term of court in a county in which civil
and criminal terms of court are designated; and for purposes of this Code section
it shall be as if such civil term was not held.

Id.
634. 264 Ga. 527, 449 S.E.2d 79 (1994).
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for a speedy trial, and then pursues an interlocutory appeal, when does
the "speedy trial clock" resume ticking after the appellate court denies
the appeal? 5 This question arose because of a technicality. In Henry,
the remittur from the court of appeals was filed in the Superior Court's
clerk's office, but was not entered on the minutes of the trial court. 36
The court acknowledged that language in some prior cases seemed to
suggest that the remittur must be entered on the minutes of the trial
court before the clock restarts, but expressed concern that such a rule,
would allow the trial court to "effectively eviscerate the demand by
failing to enter the remittur upon the minutes of the court." 7 The
court held that "the filing of the remittur in the lower court should be
the point in time at which the demand clock should resume ticking." 8
The second question in Henry was how soon after the filing of the
remittur the trial would have to occur."' The appellant argued that
the clock should simply resume ticking at the point that the appeal
stopped the clock.'" The court rejected this position, noting that such
a rule could create significant scheduling problems for the courts and
prosecutors."' However, the court expressed concern that a speedy
trial demand should not be ineffective because a defendant exercises the
right to appeal." 2 The court held:
[U]pon the filing of the remittur from the appellate court by the clerk's
office of the trial court, the State shall have the remainder of that term
and one additional regular term of court in which to try the defendant
pursuant to his demand for trial, provided there are juries impaneled
and qualified to try the defendant.'
In effect, this holding restarts the speedy trial clock after appeal in
noncapital cases, as the statute imposes the same time limit at the
outset of the case. However, the court's holding does strike a balance of
the competing interests in capital cases, where the state is given two
court terms beyond the term in which the defendant files the demand.
Another speedy trial issue confronted the court in Rice v. State.6"
In that capital case, defendant's lawyer filed a speedy trial demand, but

635.
636.
637.
638.
639.

Id. at 528-29, 449 S.E.2d at 81.
Id.
Id. at 529, 449 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 530, 449 S.E.2d at 81.
ld.

640. Id., 449 S.E.2d at 82.
641. Id. at 530-31, 449 S.E.2d at 82.
642. Id. at 531, 449 S.E.2d at 82.

643. Id.
644. 264 Ga. 846, 452 S.E.2d 492 (1995).
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later asked for a one-month continuance when the case was scheduled
for trial during the second term of court following the demand." 5 The
trial court granted the motion, but ruled that the request for continuance constituted a waiver of the speedy trial demand.'
Although the
one-month continuance expired during the same term of court, defendant
was not tried in that term, or the next, as would have been required if
the demand had not been deemed waived." 7 Defendant argued that
because the one-month continuance did not take the case outside the
term in which the continuance was granted, he was ready for trial
within that term and did not waive his speedy trial demand.'
The
court declined, however, to equate the lapsing of the period of continuance with the requirement of being "present in court announcing ready
for trial," as required in capital cases.' 9 The court held that "any
continuance granted at the defendant's request will operate as a waiver
of a speedy trial demand." 50
State v. McKnight"5 focused on a difference between the speedy trial
statute governing capital cases and the speedy trial statute for
noncapital cases: In noncapital cases, there is no requirement that the
defendant be present in court and announce ready for trial.6 52 In
McKnight, a noncapital case, the trial court found a waiver of a speedy
trial demand where defendant was present, but his lawyer was
absent.6
The court of appeals held that the absence of defendant's
lawyer did not waive the demand because the lawyer reasonably believed
he was "on call."6 The supreme court noted that the statutory rule
in capital cases may be superior because it requires that counsel be
present in court and avoids inquiries into the reasons for counsel's
absence. 55 The court stated, however, that rewriting the statute is a
legislative matter.656 Under the speedy trial statute for noncapital
cases, the unjustified absence of counsel will result in a waiver, but a
justified absence, as in McKnight, would not create a waiver.5 7

645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.

Id. at 846-47, 452 S.E.2d at 493.
Id. at 847, 452 S.E.2d at 493.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
265 Ga. 701, 462 S.E.2d 142 (1995).
Id. at 702, 462 S.E.2d at 143.
Id. at 701, 462 S.E.2d at 143.
Id.
Id. at 702, 462 S.E.2d at 143.
Id.
Id.
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Prosecutions of Juveniles. Like all criminal jurisdictions, Georgia
is faced with the growing problem of juveniles engaged in violent crime.
Like many criminal jurisdictions, Georgia has moved in the direction of
dealing harshly with juvenile offenders and away from the traditional
model of maintaining a wholly separate juvenile justice system aimed at
rehabilitation. In Bishop v. State,65 the supreme court rejected
several constitutional challenges to Georgia's procedures for determining
when juveniles may be tried as adults. Under the existing procedural
statutes, the superior court is given exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles
thirteen to seventeen years old who are alleged to have committed
certain serious crimes. 59 The prosecutor is given pre-indictment
discretion to decline to prosecute an eligible juvenile in the superior
court, and the court is given post-indictment discretion to transfer cases
to the juvenile court.s ° In Bishop, the supreme court held that the
statutory scheme does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, the
due process rights of juveniles, or the equal protection provisions of the
state and federal constitutions.66 ' In an eloquent concurring opinion,
Chief Justice Benham called on the legislature to set statutory guidelines regulating the prosecutor's exercise of discretion in selecting the
forum for prosecution.6 2 The Chief Justice stated:
As we cope with the reality that society has begotten some children
who boastfully, remorselessly stride across the line which separates
right from wrong, we must not forget that there are young people who
only stray onto the wrong side of the law. We, as a society, must

remember that some children are only strayers and we must actively
work to rescue, rehabilitate, and nurture them. Our laws must give

658. 265 Ga. 821, 462 S.E.2d 716 (1995).
659. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5(b) (1994). The statute provides as follows:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall have
concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court over a child who is alleged to have
committed a delinquent act which would be considered a crime if tried in a
superior court and for which the child may be punished by loss of life, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or confinement for life in a penal
institution.
(2) (A) The superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any matter
concerning any child 13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed any
of the following offenses: (i) Murder; (ii) Voluntary manslaughter; (iii) Rape; (iv)
Aggravated sodomy; (v) Aggravated child molestation; (vi) Aggravated sexual
battery; or (vii) Armed robbery if committed with a firearm.
Id.

660. Id.
661. 265 Ga. at 822-24, 462 S.E.2d at 717-19.
662. Id. at 824, 462 S.E.2d at 719 (Benham, C.J., concurring).
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direction to those responsible for the enforcement of the laws who
determine which child shall be set on a course of rehabilitation in the
juvenile court system, and which child shall be sent to superior court
for punishment.'

Right to Counsel. Several decisions from the survey period
addressed issues concerning the right to counsel during the litigation
phase of the criminal process. In Hasty v. State,' the court of appeals
reversed a kidnapping conviction because the trial court improperly
required defendant to represent himself at trial, finding that defendant
had not diligently attempted to retain counsel by the date of trial.
Defendant had been set for trial in May 1991, at which time he was to
be represented by appointed counsel.'
Before the trial began, Hasty
stated that he wanted to fire his appointed lawyer."
The court
discharged the lawyer after Hasty asked for time to retain counsel. 7
The trial court set the trial for the following July and warned Hasty that
he would be tried in July, either with his hired lawyer or pro se.'
When Hasty, who was in custody, was brought to court in July, he had
not retained counsel." 9 The trial commenced with Hasty representing
himself.670 Hasty was convicted and sentenced to life in prison,'
At a post-conviction hearing, evidence was presented that Hasty had,
in fact, attempted to find a lawyer, but was not successful.672 Hasty
testified that when he was brought to court in July, he told the court he
could not afford an attorney and wanted one.673 The court of appeals
concluded that the evidence at the hearing showed that defendant had
acted with due diligence in attempting to retain a lawyer.674 The court
stated, "[t]he reason for no retained counsel was lack of funds, not lack
of diligence."675 The court of appeals expressed dissatisfaction with the
trial court's handling of the matter. The court of appeals pointed out
that the trial court had not inquired at the time of Hasty's first
scheduled trial about how Hasty, who had been found indigent, expected
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664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.

Id.
215 Ga. App. 155, 450 S.E.2d 278 (1994).
Id. at 155, 450 S.E.2d at 279.
Id. at 155-56, 450 S.E.2d at 279.
Id. at 156, 450 S.E.2d at 279-80.
Id., 450 S.E.2d at 280.
Id. at 157, 450 S.E.2d at 280.

670. Id.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 156-57, 450 S.E.2d at 280.
673. Id. at 157, 450 S.E.2d at 280.

674. Id.
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to hire a lawyer.676 The court of appeals also stated that the trial
court did an inadequate job of explaining the dangers of self-representation and failed to inform Hasty that if he could not afford a lawyer, one
could not be appointed.6 77 The court of appeals held that Hasty had
not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel
and that a new trial was necessary.678 Trial judges have a very
difficult task when faced with indigent defendants who are unhappy
with their appointed counsel. Allowing clients to fire appointed counsel
leads to delays and may provide a means for defendants to manipulate
the system. The decision in Hasty is a reminder to trial judges of the
care, and patience, that must be exercised in ensuring that the balance
is struck between the need to expedite cases and the defendant's right
to counsel.
The court of appeals ruled on another right to counsel issue in Parker
v. State. 79 In Parker,defendant testified in his own defense, completThe trial judge
ing his direct testimony on a Friday afternoon.'
ordered defense counsel not to consult with defendant about. his
testimony during the weekend recess."' The court of appeals noted
that the United States Supreme Court has held that an order preventing
any consultation during an overnight recess violates the right to
counsel, 2 but that the Court has held there is no violation when a
In Parker, the
judge enters a similar order during a short recess.'
rule relating to overnight recesses, which is designed to allow full
consultation on trial related matters, obviously was the relevant
Thus, the trial court should not have issued the order
rule.'
restricting defendant's consultations with his attorney during the
weekend break. However, the court of appeals refused to reverse
defendant's conviction on this basis because there was no objection to the
order and no indication in the trial record that any consultation was
desired. 6 The court dismissed defendant's post-trial testimony, in
which he claimed that he had wanted to confer with his lawyer over the
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Id. at 156, 450 S.E.2d at 280.
Id.
Id. at 159, 450 S.E.2d at 281-82.
220 Ga. App. 303, 469 S.E.2d 410 (1996).
Id. at 304, 469 S.E.2d at 412.
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Id., 469 S.E.2d at 413. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
220 Ga. App. at 304, 469 S.E.2d at 413. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
220 Ga. App. at 305, 469 S.E.2d at 413.
Id. at 304-05, 469 S.E.2d at 413.
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weekend recess.'
The court stated that this testimony "was.given
7
long after the fact and does not serve to resurrect this claim.""
Another right to counsel decision, Johnson v. State,' is of a very
rare species. Johnson reversed a conviction based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel." 9 Johnson was convicted of murder
Johnson's lawyer knew of
despite a claim of was self defense.6
evidence of other acts of violence by the victim, but thought the evidence
inadmissible and cumulative, and therefore did not file the notice
required before presenting such evidence.691 The court of appeals
applied the familiar test of Strickland v. Washington:6 2 Did counsel's
performance fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and
thereby prejudice his defense? 93 As for the first prong of the test, the
court concluded that the lawyer's error was so bad that it was outside
the broad range of professional conduct.6' The court was troubled by
the lawyer's failure to marshall evidence going to the heart of the
defense as well as the lawyer's inept post-trial explanations.695 The
court was blunt: "Counsel was clearly unprepared to defend appellant."' The court's finding on the second prong of the Strickland test
was equally unusual. The defendant must demonstrate that there is a
reasonable probability that counsel's performance changed the outcome
of the trial.69 7 The court concluded that the evidence of the victim's
prior violence may well have resulted in acquittal or conviction on a
lesser offense.69 Therefore, the court reversed the conviction, finding
the trial court's contrary ruling to be clearly erroneous.6' The Strickland test has been criticized as a paper tiger. The reluctance of courts
to engage in Monday-morning quarterbacking is part of the reason why
many apparent lawyering errors are held to be within the range of
competent conduct or are dismissed as harmless. The decision in

686. Id.
687. Id.
688. 266 Ga. 380, 467 S.E.2d 542 (1996).
689. Id. at 381-82, 467 S.E.2d at 544.

690. Id. at 380-81, 467 S.E.2d at 543-44.
691. Id. at 382, 467 S.E.2d at 544.
692. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

693. 266 Ga. at 381, 467 S.E.2d at 544.
694. Id. at 383, 467 S.E.2d at 545.
695. Id. at 382-83, 467 S.E.2d at 545.
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Johnson may mean that successful claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in Georgia will not be so rare as to be virtually extinct.
Guilty Pleas. Guilty pleas play a critical role in the criminal justice
system. The vast majority of criminal cases are disposed of through this
mechanism. In State v. Evans,"0 the supreme court interpreted
Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9, which states, "[niotwithstanding the
acceptance of a plea of guilty, the judge should not enter a judgment
upon such plea without making such inquiry on the record as may
satisfy him that there is a factual basis for the plea."7"' In Evans, the
court was faced with a case where the plea hearing contained no
statements by anyone as to the facts of the alleged rape. 7' The legal
question before the court was whether Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9
is mandatory,, thereby requiring the trial court to follow it.70 3 The
supreme court held that the rule was mandatory and that trial courts
are obliged to inquire as to the factual basis during the plea hearing.70
The supreme court offered some guidance for trial courts concerning
compliance with the rule. The court stated that the law "would clearly
permit a trial court to glean the factual basis for a plea from facts put
on the record at the guilty plea hearing, such as through the trial court
questioning the defendant or through the prosecutor stating what he
expected the evidence to show at trial."70 5 The court expressed its
preference for trial courts to engage defendants in a colloquy to establish
the factual basis for the plea.7
The court also indicated that it is
permissible for the trial court
to learn the factual basis from material contained in parts of the record
other than the guilty plea hearing so long as the trial court makes
clear on the plea hearing record that he is relying on those parts of the
record and so long as those parts of the record are made part of the
record for appeal.7 7
The court also stated that there is no requirement that the trial court
affirmatively state its finding that the factual basis is sufficient.0 8

700. 265 Ga. 332, 454 S.E.2d 468 (1995).
701. Id. at 332, 454 S.E.2d at 470.

702. Id.
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at 333, 454 S.E.2d at 471.
at 333-34, 454 S.E.2d at 471.
at 334-35, 454 S.E.2d at 472.
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There was one final lesson in Evans. Despite finding a clear failure
to follow Rule 33.9, the court refused to allow defendant to withdraw his
plea of guilty, finding that defendant had not demonstrated "manifest
injustice."70 9 The court based this holding on the presence in the
record of an affidavit of an investigator which, although not part of the
plea hearing, described the rape victim's version of the crime.7 1 The
court stated that although the affidavit could not cure the violation of
Rule 33.9, it could be relied upon in the analysis of the manifest
injustice issue. 711 Thus, while Evans encourages trial courts to
carefully abide by Rule 33.9, it signals that reversals for violating the
rule will be infrequent, because other portions of the record, perhaps
added for this purpose, will serve to assure the appellate courts of the
defendant's factual guilt.
State v. Barrett712 addressed the issue of whether the state and a
defendant may enter into a plea agreement including a provision that
the defendant will waive the statute of limitations as to charges
dismissed as part of the plea agreement, thereby allowing the charges
to be reinstated after the normal period of limitations in the event of a
breach by the defendant.711 In 1991, Tommy Lee Barrett, the Mayor
of the City of Baldwin, was indicted on six counts charging various theft
crimes."" Barrett entered a guilty plea to two counts pursuant to a
plea agreement.715 Under the agreement, the other counts were dismissed.716 However, the agreement also provided that defendant
would resign his post as mayor and "never again seek, run for, nor
accept election or appointment to any public office."717 To enforce this
promise, Barrett agreed that if he ever defaulted on the agreement, the
of
state would be allowed to prosecute him "regardless of any statute
71
limitations, right to speedy trial, or any other bar to prosecution."
Barrett was discharged from probation in 1992. 7' 9 In 1993, Barrett
was elected again as Mayor of Baldwin. 720 A few weeks later, Barrett
was re-indicted on all charges; the State conceded that the normal
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statute of limitations period had expired. 21 The court upheld the
validity of the plea agreement, stating, "[wie see no absolute bar to a
defendant's waiver of the protection afforded him by the statutes of
limitation."722 The court further stated, "[a]s Barrett can and did
waive the statutes of limitation, the indictments can proceed without
regard to the periods of limitation."7 21 , There were two limitations to
this holding. First, as to the two counts to which Barrett pleaded guilty
and completed his sentence of probation, the court ruled that reprosecution on those counts would constitute double jeopardy and an invasion
of the court's sentencing authority.2 This was an important qualification to the court's reasoning, because it meant that Barrett could only
be reprosecuted on the charges dismissed at the time of the plea
agreement. This seems a curious result. It means that the state would
have no way to enforce its agreement if Barrett had pleaded guilty to all
the charges. If Barrett received his original sentence in the context of
a plea agreement, why is it unfair to reprosecute on the counts to which
he pleaded guilty? In fact, Barrett had agreed to this result in the plea
agreement by waiving the right to raise any bar to prosecution, which
includes the double jeopardy bar. The other limitation on the court's
holding was that the court left open the question of whether plea
agreements may contain provisions of unlimited duration, such as
Barrett's promise that he would never seek office.72 The court found
that the agreement in Barrett was acceptable because it was within the
72
ten-year bar from seeking office allowed in the Georgia constitution. 1
Venue. In Mega v. State,727 the court of appeals issued a reminder
to prosecutors and pointed to an opportunity for defense attorneys. The
reminder to prosecutors was this: Don't forget to offer evidence
establishing venue! The opportunity for defense counsel is that a
prosecutor who forgets to prove venue has a fatally defective case. In
Mega, defendant was charged with selling beer to an underage person
in Cobb county.7" The testimony identified the address of the package
store ("2084 South Cobb Drive... right off Pat Mell Road") and the fact
that the investigators were with the Cobb County Police Depart-

721. Id. at 401-02, 404, 451 S.E.2d at 84, 85.
722. Id. at 405, 451 S.E.2d at 86.
723. Id. at 406, 451 S.E.2d at 87.
724. Id. at 403, 451 S.E.2d at 84.
725. Id. at 404, 451 S.E.2d at 86.
726. Id. See GA. CONST. 1983, art. II, § 2, para. 3.
727. 220 Ga. App. 481, 469 S.E.2d 771 (1996).
728. Id. at 481-82, 469 S.E.2d at 771-72.
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Although defendant did not challenge venue at trial, the

court of appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to allow a
rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime
occurred in Cobb County.7 ° The court reached this conclusion despite
some prior precedent suggesting that slight evidence is sufficient to
prove venue when the defendant does not challenge venue at trial.731
The court also declined the State's invitation to take judicial notice of
the location of the package store. 3 2
Double Jeopardy/Due Process. The supreme court's decision in
Griffin v. State73 3 addressed several thorny issues concerning double
jeopardy and due process. In 1992, Griffin was indicted in McIntosh
The prosecution did not
County for the murder of Jenny Rhames. 3
seek the death penalty.735 Griffin's first trial ended in a mistrial and
the State reindicted Griffin for murder, intending to try him again.78 6
When the trial court denied Griffin's plea of former jeopardy, Griffin apWhile that appeal was pending, prosecutors in Thomas
pealed. 73
County charged Griffin with murdering and kidnapping Jenny Rhames
and announced they were seeking the death penalty.7 8 After the court
of appeals denied the former jeopardy claim and remitted the case to the
court in McIntosh County, the prosecution dismissed the case. 739
When the Thomas County prosecution proceeded, Griffin filed an interim
appeal. 4 '
The first issue was whether the Thomas County murder charge should
have been quashed. 741 Because the Thomas County murder charge
was filed while the McIntosh County murder charge was still pending,
the supreme court ruled that the Thomas County charge must be
quashed.742 The subsequent dismissal of the McIntosh County charge
did not matter; the Thomas County charge was invalid because it was
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initiated during the pendency of the McIntosh charge.743 The court
stated: "To permit this action to proceed under the present indictment
would erode the protection of criminal defendants from having to defend
themselves simultaneously in two State courts for the same alleged
offense." 7" The court also pointed out that Griffin's appeal in the
McIntosh County case was a double jeopardy claim and that allowing
Thomas County to proceed with a murder charge would force Griffin to
defend against a charge involving the same murder before his double
jeopardy claim was resolved.74 - While the court quashed the murder
charge, its ruling was not much of a victory for Griffin. The court made
it clear that the state was free to reindict Griffin for murder in any
county having jurisdiction, including Thomas County.7"
A second issue was whether the kidnapping charge filed in Thomas
County, which had exclusive venue of the kidnapping crime, was
procedurally barred.74 7 Griffin argued that the State violated the
"single prosecution" requirement of O.C.G.A. section 16-1-7(b), which
requires that, if possible, all crimes arising out of the same conduct be
brought in a single case.74 Griffin contended that it was improper to
indict him for murder in one county and kidnapping in another when
both charges could have been brought in one jurisdiction.749 The
supreme court rejected this argument, holding that O.C.G.A. section 161-7(b) did not require that the murder charge be brought in the same
county as the kidnapping charge. 7' Three justices dissented on this
point, stating that they would interpret the statute so that the state
would be required to bring all the related charges in one jurisdiction.75 '
The third issue was whether the State's filing of the kidnapping
charge or its decision to seek the death penalty were improper. Griffin
argued that both actions were vindictive and that the decision to seek

743. Id. at 116, 464 S.E.2d at 373.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Id. at 117, 464 S.E.2d at 373.
747. Id.
748. Id. See O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(b), which states as follows:
If the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper
prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the
jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution
except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section.

O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(b) (1996).
749. 266 Ga. at 117, 464 S.E.2d at 374.
750. Id. at 118, 464 S.E.2d at 374.
751. Id. at 121-22, 464 S.E.2d at 376-77 (Thompson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 125-27, 464 S.E.2d at 379-80 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting in part).
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the death penalty created double jeopardy. 5 2 As for the claim that the
State was violating Griffin's due process rights by vindicative prosecution, the court concluded that Griffin's rights were not violated.7" 3 The
court said the kidnapping charge was a separate offense from the
murder charge and that the State was not obligated to bring the charges
together.7 4 The court also said that the decision to seek the death
penalty was not a vindictive effort by the State to punish Griffin,
reasoning that this was unlike a case where the state "ups the ante"
after a successful appeal by a defendant.755 In this case, the court
stated, the event that created the opportunity to seek an enhanced
penalty was a mistrial, which "is not subject to chilling as is the exercise
of the right to appeal." 5 Two of the dissenters disagreed, arguing
that the lodging of the kidnapping charge and the decision to seek the
death penalty should be presumed to be vindictive.757
The remaining argument was Griffin's claim that the decision to seek
the death penalty constituted double jeopardy because the State did not
seek the death penalty in the original McIntosh County case. This was
an issue of first impression."' Griffin argued that the failure of the
State to seek the death penalty at the first trial should be treated as a
concession that the State could not prove the aggravating circumstances
required to obtain the death penalty. 759 The court rejected this claim,

holding that the mistrial did not say anything about whether the State
had sufficient evidence to establish the required aggravating circumstances. 760 Justice Sears dissented on this holding, stating that she
believed the double jeopardy clause prevents the State from seeking the
death penalty in the second trial, especially in light of the tactical
advantages of having seen Griffin's defense in the first trial.6
The most troubling aspect of the Griffin case is the court's analysis of
the State's decision to seek the death penalty in the second case. As the
dissent pointed out, there was no new evidence or other justification for
the State's changed position concerning the death penalty.762 The only
intervening events were that the McIntosh County trial ended in a
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mistrial and that Griffin had pursued an appeal. This appears to be an
appropriate situation to presume vindictiveness by the prosecution and
to require that presumption to be effectively rebutted. This seems
particularly appropriate where the state "ups the ante" by deciding to
pursue the death penalty. As Justice Fletcher argued in dissent, Griffin
probably felt minimal pressure to plead guilty after the mistrial, but "a
defendant newly confronted with even a remote chance
of execution may
" 763
feel forced to plead guilty and accept a life sentence.
The were several other noteworthy cases addressing double jeopardy
issues. Bailey v. State"' presented the question whether there was
"manifest necessity" for declaration of a mistrial, thereby allowing a
retrial without implicating the double jeopardy bar. What was unusual
was that Bailey involved a mistrial declared at a bench trial.765 Bailey
was charged with driving under the influence, and had a bench trial in
August 1994.7" During the brief trial, Bailey challenged the admissibility of the blood alcohol test.767 The judge took the motion and the

verdict under advisement. In November 1994, the court ruled that the
test results were inadmissible and that the court could not remove the
test results from its consideration of the case. 7' Therefore, the court,
on its own motion, declared a mistrial.7" Bailey, who had not requested or consented to the mistrial, argued that a retrial would be double
jeopardy.770 The court of appeals noted that "[i]t is highly unusual for
a judge to declare that he is unable to disregard inadmissible evidence."771 The court concluded, however, that "the trial judge's
inability to disregard evidence he ruled inadmissible constitutes a
manifest necessity for a mistrial."77' The dissent argued that the
problem that caused the mistrial was not the sort of unforeseeable event
that amounts to manifest necessity. 77

The dissent also took the trial

judge to task for the long delay in reaching the decision to declare a
mistrial.7
One dissenter expressed concern that the judge had
conceded he could not be fair, stating,
763.
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a judge trained in the law is expected to be able to distinguish between
admissible and inadmissible evidence. While the trial court's candor
is commendable, this is not a case where the inadmissible evidence is
so emotionally charged that no reasonable person could disregard it.
If the ability to make this distinction is not required of trial courts as
a matter of course, how can we ever expect a jury to follow a trial
court's curative instructions to disregard evidence in similar circumstances?...
That question really goes to the crux of the matter. The ruling in
Bailey recognizes that judges sometimes have a hard time compartmentalizing admissible and inadmissible proof, just like lay jurors. One gets
the impression that the court of appeals, which called the situation
"highly unusual," was discouraging this sort of judicial conduct and
hoping that such conduct would remain "highly unusual."776 This case
provides an interesting perspective on a major premise of our system of
trials: the presumption that the trier of fact can disregard inadmissible
material. That presumption is vital to the ability of the criminal justice
system to dispose of cases. Bailey is a case in point. Because the judge
was unable to disregard the evidence, a new trial was needed to cure the
prejudice. Has the need to process cases caused the system to be
grounded on a presumption that in many cases is a myth and a fiction?
Consider the evidence in Bailey. When deciding whether to convict
Bailey of drunk driving, could the judge put out of mind the fact that
Bailey had flunked the blood test? Our system embraces the belief that
judges can do that. The ultimate result in Bailey was that defendant
was to have a new trial before a jury that would not be told about the
blood test. Given the judge's forthright concern about his ability to be
fair, that seems the better result. Perhaps the court should have been
more supportive of the judge's decision.
77 the court of appeals also confronted the
In State v. Williams,"
double jeopardy issue that arises in prosecutions for serious offenses
arising out of the operation of motor vehicles. Like most states, Georgia
allows citations to be issued for traffic offenses, and these citations are
often resolved with dispatch. When more serious charges relating to the
same conduct are filed, the defendant can argue that the penalty
recieved on the traffic citation creates a double jeopardy bar to prosecution on more serious charges. The traditional test is the Blockburger v'

775. Id. at 263, 465 S.E.2d at 288 (Ruffin, J., dissenting).
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777. 214 Ga. App. 701, 448 S.E.2d 700 (1994).
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test, which states that crimes are separate for double jeopardy purposes
if each
offense requires proof of an element or fact that the other does
79
not.

7

In Williams, defendant was issued a citation for improper passing
after he was involved in a traffic collision. 7' The day after the
collision, warrants were issued for improper passing and serious injury
by vehicle.78 1 When the injured victim of the crash died, the warrant
for serious injury by vehicle was lifted and a warrant for vehicular
homicide was issued.7 2 However, the original citation for improper
passing was not lifted.788 Defendant appeared in probate court,
pleaded guilty to the improper passing citation, and paid a fine of fortyeight dollars.78 4 When the State indicted defendant for improper
7
passing and vehicular homicide, defendant argued double jeopardy. 11
Under the Blockburger test, the charge of improper passing, the very
charge to which the guilty plea was entered, was barred. 7" As for the
vehicular homicide charge, that was also barred because "proof of
improper passing requires proof of no element or fact which is not also
necessary to prove vehicular homicide,
and the former is necessarily a
7 7
lesser included offense of the latter."

Four judges joined a dissenting opinion.788 The dissent expressed
concern that defendant had escaped a prosecution for vehicular homicide
by paying a forty-eight dollar fine. The dissent tried mightily to find a
way around the majority's straightforward application of the Blockburger
test. The dissent argued that defendant was not "prosecuted" when he
went to probate court; that the probate court had exclusive jurisdition
over the matter, rendering the superior court's double jeopardy ruling a
nullity, and even that defendant's plea in the probate court was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered.7 9 The dissenters' frustration was
understandable, even if the arguments were unavailling. Given the

779. The United States Supreme Court, in a case arising in a successive prosecution
under Florida's system of prosecuting traffic related offenses, expanded double jeopardy
protections of Blockburger in 1990. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990). However, that
experiment was short-lived. The court overuled Grady v. Corbin in 1993, restoring the
Blockburger test as the exclusive test. United States v. Dixon 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
780. 214 Ga. App. at 701, 448 S.E.2d at 700. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-44.
781. Id. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-394 (1996).
782. 214 Ga. App. at 701-02, 448 S.E.2d at 700. See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393(b).
783. 214 Ga. App. at 702, 448 S.E.2d at 701.
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current state of double jeopardy law, the focus must be on ensuring
vigilance on the part of the law enforcement establishment in the
management of the two-tiered traffic court system.
A final noteworthy double jeopardy decision was issued in Preist v.
State.7" Defendant was acquitted of malice murder, but found guilty
of felony murder, predicated on the commission of the felonies of armed
robbery and aggravated assault.7 9' The trial court granted defendant's
motion for a new trial, finding that the evidence was insufficient to
prove the predicate felonies of armed robbery and aggravated assault." Defendant subsequently sought to bar his further prosecution
The trial court denied the double jeopardy
for felony murder.79
motion, but certified its ruling for interlocutory review.794 The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court's findings that the
evidence was insufficient precluded further prosecution under the double
jeopardy doctrine.79
Peremptory Challenges: Batson. The criminal justice system's
struggle to deal with racial bias is graphically illustrated by litigation
over allegations that peremptory challenges are being used to strike
prospective jurors on account of their race. In Batson v. Kentucky,"'
the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
precluded a prosecutor from striking prospective jurors on account of
their race.797 Under the now familiar procedure, if the party raising
the Batson objection makes a prima facie case that a peremptory
challenge was racially motivated, the burden shifts to the party making
the challenge to provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike.7 9
Experienced litigators know that the Batson procedure is not without
problems. One problem is that the proceedings can become emotionally
charged; no one likes to be called a racist. Another problem is that the
required threshold prima facie showing by the moving party is not
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265 Ga. 399, 456 S.E.2d 503 (1995).
Id. at 399, 456 S.E.2d at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id.

795. Id. at 399-400, 456 S.E.2d at 504.
796. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
797. Since Batson, it has been held that the prohibition against racially motivated
peremptory challenges also applies to the defendant. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42
(1992). The prohibition has also been expanded to apply to peremptory challenges
motivated by factors other than race. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352
(1991) (Hispanics); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender).
798. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
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difficult to meet. In fact, upon the making of a Batson motion, many
trial judges simply assume a prima facie case has been made and protect
the record by requiring race-neutral explanations to be stated. The third
problem is that even a racially motivated attorney will rarely be at a
complete loss to suggest a reason for the strike that is race neutral, and
sorting the sincere reasons from the pretextual is difficult for the court.
It is a rare case in which there is a "smoking gun" that clearly establishes the racial motivation behind the strike. Furthermore, the court's task
is complicated because the race-neutral explanation for a peremptory
challenge does not have to rise to the level of a challenge for cause. The
Supreme Court recently emphasized the minimal nature of the required
explanation, stating that race-neutral reasons need not be persuasive or
even plausible, although the implausibility of the reason may be
considered in determining whether the strike amounted to purposeful
racial discrimination.7 Batson litigation is a thicket.
Three cases from the survey period serve to demonstrate the difficulties of Batson litigation and how the Georgia courts have addressed the
problems. In Smith v. State,"° the supreme court rejected several
Batson claims, finding that the trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons was not clearly erroneous. In Smith,
defendant challenged the following explanations: that a potential juror
lived in public housing; that a potential juror lived near defendant, the
witnesses, or the crime scene; and that a potential juror was divorced or
childless.0 1 Defendant claimed that these reasons were pretextual
and, in the case of the explanations concerning where the jurors lived,
facially obvious surrogates for race.80 2 Defendant bolstered his argument by pointing out that the prosecutor did minimal questioning of the
black prospective jurors and failed to strike some white jurors who had
the race-neutral traits that had been used to justify the strikes of black
jurors. 3 The supreme court, reviewing the record under the deferential clear error standard, upheld the trial court's conclusion that the
peremptory challenges were not racially motivated.' 4 The record in
Smith included a thorough account of the prosecutor's reasons for
striking some jurors and not others.0' One clear lesson of Smith is
that when a Batson issue arises, the trial court should carefully develop
the record concerning the basis for peremptory challenges. That did not
799. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).
800. 264 Ga. 449, 448 S.E.2d 179 (1994).
801. Id. at 449, 451-52, 448 S.E.2d at 181-82.
802. Id. at 450-53, 448 S.E.2d at 181-83.

803. Id. at 452-53, 448 S.E.2d at 182-83.
804. Id. at 454, 448 S.E.2d at 184.

805. Id. at 450-53, 448 S.E.2d at 181-83.
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The
occur in Smith until there was a remand for that purpose.'
better practice would be to develop the record during jury selection, so
that the statements of counsel are spontaneous and untainted by afterthe-fact justification.
Two court of appeals decisions from the survey period contrast with
Smith. In Parker v. State,'°7 the court reversed defendant's robbery
convictions because the prosecutor improperly used peremptory
challenges to strike black jurors. During jury selection, the State had
used four of its six peremptory challenges against black prospective
jurors." s As often happens, the issue of whether Parker had met the
threshold requirement of a prima facie case was moot because the trial
The
court went forward and elicited the prosecutor's reasons.'
prosecution explained that it struck one black juror because the juror
was a college student studying criminal justice, and the prosecution
feared that the student "would take a microscopic view of the evidence"
and "an extremely narrow perspective of reasonable doubt."'1 0 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that this was a
sufficient race-neutral explanation. 81
With respect to the other three jurors, the court of appeals held that
the trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's reasons constituted clear
error.8" 2 According to the court, the prosecutor's reasons for striking
the three jurors were nothing more than guesses about the jurors'
attitudes based on their demeanor, and failed to overcome the prima
facie showing of racial motivation." 3 The prosecutor stated that one
juror was unhappy to be a juror, inattentive, unfocused, and hostile.814
Another juror was said to be dour, frowning, and refused to make eye
contact with the prosecutor, who concluded that the juror was annoyed
to be called to court.8"' The third juror seemed to be sleeping and had
been a babysitter for relatives of a fellow prosecutor. 16 The court of
appeals was "troubled by such complete reliance on bare hunches drawn
from jurors' demeanor and the apparent absence of any inquiry into
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Id. at 449, 448 S.E.2d at 180.
219 Ga. App. 361, 464 S.E.2d 910 (1995).
Id. at 362, 464 S.E.2d at 911.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363-64, 464 S.E.2d at 912.
Id.
Id. at 362-63, 464 S.E.2d at 911.
Id. at 363, 464 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 362, 464 S.E.2d at 911.
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whether these jurors actually held any biases."'17 The court stated
that the prosecutor's reasons "reflected unacceptable stereotypical
attitudes as to particular groups." 18 The court also stated that it
failed to see how the reasons were related to the case.819
One may question whether the court of appeals was sufficiently
deferential to the trial judge. The court of appeals seems to have
engaged in a practice like the one it was criticizing, namely judging the
attitude of the prosecutor on scant evidence. Indeed, the court of
appeals did this without the benefit of personally observing the
prosecutor and the jurors demeanor, something the trial judge had the
opportunity to do. When the prosecutor presents the reasons for a
strike, the trial judge, to some extent, is making a credibility determination. This is the sort of determination appellate courts rarely reverse as
clear error. Of course, the court of appeals could objectively evaluate the
prosecutor's statements. But even on this score, questions may be
raised. Trial lawyers know that jury selection, or, as it is sometimes
called, de-selection, involves trying to eliminate jurors whose attitudes
may prevent them from being fair. Prosecutors worry about the common
problem of jurors who are angry over having to serve or who harbor
attitudes hostile to the criminal justice system. That concern is
legitimate, and it is difficult to say it does not "relate to the case." As
for the failure to inquire further, specific questions going to bias ("Are
you angry about being called for jury duty?") are rarely fruitful and may
serve to alienate the questioned juror and the jury panel. As the
concurring opinion in Parker pointed out, recent federal precedent, not
cited by the majority, would have required affirmance. 20 The concurring opinion characterized the judgment in Parker as being based on
prior Georgia opinions establishing a requirement that the reasons for
a peremptory challenge be "case related." 21 Recognizing the Batson
thicket, the concurring opinion joined those who have expressed the view
that the 8best
course would simply be to eliminate the peremptory
22
challenge.

Another court of appeals decision concerning Batson issues was
Mattison v.State.28 In that case, the venire included eighteen blacks

817. Id. at 363, 464 S.E.2d at 912.
818. Id.
819. Id.
820. Id. at 364-65, 464 S.E.2d at 913 (Pope, P.J., concurring specially). See Purkett v.
Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).
821. Id.
822. Id. at 365, 464 S.E.2d at 913.
823. 215 Ga. App. 635, 451 S.E.2d 807 (1994).
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and seventeen whites.8"' Eight blacks ended up on the jury; one other
black served as an alternate. 825 The prosecution used five of its six
peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors. 826 The court
of appeals stated, "[tihis overwhelming pattern of strikes establishes a
prima facie inference of racial discrimination."127 The court went on
to scrutinize the race-neutral reasons given by the prosecution and
accepted by the trial court. The court of appeals held that the trial court
was clearly erroneous in its assessment of the prosecution's explanations.8" The dominant theme of the court of appeals decision was that
the race-neutral reasons given by the prosecution for striking blacks did
not result in the striking of white jurors who might have been struck on
the same basis. 82 While the court of appeals noted the deference to
be accorded the trial court's findings, the court said it did not want to be
a "rubber stamp" approving "all nonracial reasons no matter how
whimsical or fanciful."3 0 It is hard to conclude that the prosecution's
stated reasons deserve to be described as "whimsical" or "fanciful." By
way of example, the prosecution struck two jurors who knew persons
who were mistakenly accused of a crime and one juror who had a
relative who had been beaten by police." 1 These reasons are not
farfetched. The argument that other jurors were not struck for similar
reasons overlooks the fact that the number of peremptory challenges is
limited; the choice of how to expend the challenges is often a choice
between a lesser of evils. The willingness of the appellate courts to
second guess the trial court's assessment of the reasons and motivations
of the party exercising a peremptory challenge is likely to further
complicate the Batson thicket. If Batson litigation continues to grow
more unmanagable and expensive, it may well mean that the era of the
peremptory challenge may be coming to a close.
Right to Confrontation. Is it a violation of a defendant's right to
confront witnesses to remove the defendant from the courtroom during
the testimony of a witness based on a substantial threat made by the
defendant against the witness? In Perry v. State, 32 the court of

824. Id. at 636, 451 S.E.2d at 808.
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Id. at 638, 451 S.E.2d at 809.
Id. at 636-37, 451 S.E.2d at 809.
Id. at 638, 451 S.E.2d at 809 (quoting Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 326, 327
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appeals did not foresclose that the answer to that question might be
"yes," but found it unnecessary to answer the question. In Perry, two
defendants were removed from the courtroom while three witnesses
testified at their kidnapping and armed robbery trial."' The prosecution raised a concern about whether the three rebuttal witnesses had
been threatened by defendants and were fearful.3 4 The trial judge
agreed to speak to the witnesses, and ordered that defendants be
removed from the courtroom during the three hour session.'
The
testimony of the witnesses showed that they were not fearful and had
not been threatened. 6 Two of the witnesses later testified before the
jury, with defendants present." 7
The court of appeals held that under the circumstances, the refusal to
allow defendants to attend the judge's preview of the witness's testimony
violated defendants' confrontation rights."' The court called the trial
court's action an "unprecedented and drastic curtailment of the right of
confrontation." 39 The court emphasized that the witnesses, when
examined, "testified that no threats had been made against them and
they were not in actual fear for their lives."" At the same time, the
court said it would "not foreclose the possibility that other circumstances
might warrant an inquiry into real and verifiable threats against a
witness." 4 1 That leaves the question of how a trial court should
proceed when information of possible threats is brought to its attention.
Are the defendants entitled to be present for the initial inquiry in any
case in which there is a possible threat? The court expressly reserved
the issue of "[wihat inquiries may be necessary and what remedies may
be crafted to protect a witness from the threat of imminent physical
harm." 42 At a minimum, the judge should request a detailed proffer
from the prosecution. In Perry, the prosecution requested the hearing
based on a potential threat, but the testimony of the witnesses did not
support the claim. Certainly the Perry decision requires that the judge
obtain more solid information before removing the defendants.
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Sentencing. The supreme court addressed several difficult issues
concerning the scope of proper argument and evidence at sentencing
hearings in capital cases. In Fleming v. State,'8 the court held that
the prosecutionmay argue that the death penalty has a deterrent effect,
and that the defendant may rebut the argument, but neither side has a
right to introduce expert testimony on the issue. Of course, allowing
expert testimony on the issue of the deterrent value of the death penalty
would involve complex, time consuming, and (probably) inconclusive
testimony.'" In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Hunt stated that
the prosecution might open the door to empirical data on deterrence by
phrasing its deterrence argument in a way that suggests that data
supports the theory of deterrence.'" 5 In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Fletcher argued that all deterrence arguments should be excluded."'
In Justice Sears's dissenting opinion, in which she was joined by Justices
Benham and Fletcher, she argued that if deterrence arguments are
allowed, the defendant must be afforded the right to introduce evidence
on the issue." 7 The dissenting opinions have substantial force. The
majority's approach is an uneasy compromise: Allow arguments about
deterrence, but do not allow the complex and voluminous evidence that
supports both sides in the debate. It seems that the defendant should
be able to attack the empirical basis of the prosecution's argument.
Perhaps Justice Fletcher's approach makes the most sense. His position
was that on the issue of deterrence it should be all or nothing. 48
The supreme court addressed the emotional issue of victim impact
testimony in Livingston v. State.8 49 In Livingston, the court upheld the
constitutionality of O.C.G.A. section 17-10-1.2, which governs the
admissibility of victim impact evidence. 50 The court agreed with the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Payne v. Tennessee"5 ' that
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth
Amendment does not create a per se bar to the admission of victim

843. 265 Ga. 541, 458 S.E.2d 638 (1995).
844. For example, see the lengthy citation of literature on the topic of deterrence in
Justice Fletcher's dissenting opinion. Id. at 545 n.10, 458 S.E.2d 642 n.4 (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
845. Id. at 543-44, 458 S.E.2d at 640 (Hunt, C.J., concurring).
846. Id. at 544-46, 458 S.E.2d at 641-42 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
847. Id. at 546-47, 458 S.E.2d at 642 (Sears, J., dissenting).
848. Id. at 546, 458 S.E.2d at 642 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
849. 264 Ga. 402, 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994).
850. Id. at 404, 444 S.E.2d at 751.
851. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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impact evidence.852 The court added, "[hiowever we also recognize that
under certain circumstances victim impact evidence could render a
defendant's trial fundamentally unfair and could lead to the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty."' 5 The court questioned language in
Payne suggesting that the state should be able to offer evidence on every
characteristic of the victim that the defense may offer as to the
defendant.'" The court also held that some evidence admissible under
the statute may be inadmissible under the Georgia constitution, such as
evidence of the victim's class or wealth.5 5 In upholding the victim
impact statute, the court pointed to the various safeguards provided in
the statute, such as the requirement that victim impact evidence "shall
be permitted only in such a manner and to such a degree as not to
inflame or unduly prejudice the jury."8 " The court therefore upheld
the constitutionality of the statute as written under the Georgia
constitution 57 The court stressed that it was only upholding that
statute as written and that it would entertain challenges to unconstitutional applications of the statute as necessary~8 To guide the trial
courts in the application of the statute, the court went on to hold "that
the trial court must hear and rule prior to trial on the admissibility of
victim impact evidence sought to be offered." 59
Not surprisingly, this controversial issue evoked several separate
opinions from members of the court. Justice Fletcher concurred, urging
prosecutors "to cautiously approach the use of victim impact evidence."8 e He suggested that the use of such evidence carries with it
the risk of reversal by the appellate courts, which would mean more cost
and delay and pain for the victim's family."' Justice Carley concurred
specially, protesting the court's interpretation of the statute as allowing
less than equal evidentiary treatment for victims and defendants; the
standard suggested in Payne. 2 He stated, "I cannot concur in the
majority's rewriting of that statute so as to thwart the legislative intent,
which was to authorize the admission of victim impact evidence in
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accordance with the broad mandate of the decision of the Supreme Court
in Payne v. Tennessee."" Finally, Justice Benham dissented, arguing
that the court should have declared the use of victim impact evidence in
violation of the Georgia constitution."6 He stated:
The prohibition against admission of a victim impact statement is
rooted in the belief that all people stand equal before the law, defendants and victims alike .... With the victim impact statement, we
begin a journey down the treacherous path of determining the relative
worth of citizens in seeking the death penalty for the accused.'
Justice Benham expressed the fear "that the virus of the victim impact
statement will so infect the sentencing process that the trial will be
rendered fundamentally unfair, thereby greatly increasing the likelihood
of appellate reversals of otherwise valid convictions."'
In Mobley v. State, 67 the supreme court held that "offers by defendants to plead guilty and testimony of prosecutors regarding their
reasons for rejecting such offers are no longer admissible" in death
sentencing proceedings.' s This was a switch of positions by the court.
In a previous decision, the court had ruled that Mobley was entitled to
introduce evidence at his sentencing that he had offered to plead guilty
to all charges in exchange for the State's dropping the death penalty.' 9 After seeing what transpired on remand, the court changed its
mind. In rebuttal to Mobley's evidence that he offered to plead guilty,
the State offered the testimony of Judge Andrew Fuller, who had been
Mobley's prosecutor before becoming a judge.87 Fuller testified about
the factors he considered in determining to seek the death penalty
against Mobley. 71 The court found that Fuller's testimony was not
unduly inflammatory or prejudicial, but decided that such testimony was
not a good idea, stating:
By allowing the defense to introduce evidence of a conditional offer to
plead guilty, [our prior holding] virtually mandates that counsel for
both the defense and prosecution testify at trial. As a result, counsel
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are forced into ethical conflicts, their credibility is improperly placed
in issue, and advocacy rules are impaired. 72
However, the court declined to overturn Mobley's sentence of death. 7
Justice Hunstein dissented, arguing that the court had compounded its
error in its prior decision by upholding Mobley's death sentence. 74
The supreme court also decided cases concerning the defendant's
rights to use mental health evidence and secure financial support for
retaining experts for that purpose. In Jenkins v. State, 7 ' the court
held that defendants who refuse to submit to a psychiatric examination
by a state-selected examiner are not entitled to utilize psychiatric
testimony at the sentencing phase of a capital case. The court previously had held that it was appropriate to exclude the defendant's psychiatric evidence at the guilt phase when the defendant refused to submit to
the state's examination.87 6 This was based on the prosecution's
"overwhelming difficulty" in countering such evidence without its own
877
examination of the defendant.
Abernathy v. States " clarified several rules of law governing the use
of mental health evidence. First, the supreme court held that pretrial
notice of the defendant's intention to use mental health evidence is only
8 79
required when the evidence is in the form of expert testimony.
Second, the court in Abernathy held that the prosecution is not entitled
to obtain an independent mental health examination to rebut lay mental
health testimony.' Third, the court in Abernathy reiterated that "the
State may offer expert mental health testimony only in the sentencing
phase and strictly in rebuttal of the expert mental health evidence
offered in mitgation by the defense."s 1
In Bright v. State,88 2 the supreme court considered the question of
when a defendant qualifies for expert assistance at state expense for
preparing his defense for the sentencing phase of a capital case. The
court noted that the required showing for obtaining free expert
psychiatric services at the guilt and sentencing phases is that the
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defense establish that sanity will be a "significant factor."' The court
further stated that the defense is entitled to make its motion in secret,
and that the defendant's right to make the motion cannot be predicated
on a requirement to submit to a state mental health examination.8"
While the court held that Bright had not made a sufficient showing to
obtain free services for use in the guilt phase of his trial, the court held
that he had made a sufficient showing for the sentencing phase." 5
The difference in these conclusions was rooted in the difference between
the guilt and sentencing phases. The sentencing phase involves
consideration of evidence of mitigation, and that category of evidence is
substantially wider than the evidence that is relevant to guilt.88 6 The
court concluded that Bright's evidence of depression, suicidal thoughts,
poor impulse control, and substance abuse, coupled with the fact that he
murdered two relatives with whom he had a good relationship, was
sufficient to show that "his capacity to understand the cruelty of the acts
he committed" would be a significant issue at the penalty phase of his
trial.' 7 The court found that Bright had made the requisite showing
with regard to his requests for a toxicologist and a psychiatrist. 88 In
a dissenting opinion, Justice Hunstein, joined by Justice Thompson,
questioned the conclusion that funding for experts had been justified. 9 Given the nature of the showing made by Bright, the open
question is whether the decision will lead to a significant expansion of
funding for experts based on arguments in mitigation citing drug use,
depression, and the like.
The supreme court also had occasion to interpret two important
sentencing statutes in noncapital cases. In State v. Ingram, the
supreme court interpreted O.C.G.A. section 17-10-16(a), which states
that a person convicted of crime "for which the death penalty may be
imposed under the laws of this state may be sentenced to death,
imprisonment for life without parole, or life imprisonment." The issue
in Ingram was whether life without parole is a sentencing option in a
case in which the state does not seek the death penalty, or whether life
without parole is only available as an alternative in cases where the
state seeks the death penalty.891 The State claimed that O.C.G.A.
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section 17-10-16(a) authorizes the sentence of life without parole
irrespective of whether the state seeks the death penalty.'9 2 The
supreme court disagreed, holding that life without parole is only an
option when the state seeks the death penalty. 93 The court noted that
the statute in question was adopted as part of a "coherent statutory plan
whereby death provisions are and must be utilized in order to implement
the life without parole sentencing option."8'9 The court concluded that
the legislature intended to limit the life without parole option to capital
cases.' 5 The court acknowledged that its holding denied the state an
alternative for aggravated murder cases where the death penalty might
be inappropriate, but stated the "matter is best raised before the
Legislature."8g6 Justice Carley filed a strident dissenting opinion in
which he argued that the legislature meant to make the sentence of life
without parole an alternative in cases where the death penalty is not
sought.9 If Justice Carley is right, the situation will be easy for the
legislature to remedy.
In Echols v. Thomas,"g the supreme court addressed a semantic
quirk in the laws applying to sentencing in armed robbery cases. The
question was whether a defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment for armed robbery.8 9 The armed robbery statute seems to
provide an easy answer: It states that a person convicted of armed
robbery may be punished by "imprisonment for life or by imprisonment
for not less than five nor more than 20 years."
However, the state's
general sentencing statute has conflicting language: It states that a
court must fix a "determinate sentence for a specific number of months
or years" except in cases in which life imprisonment must be imposed. 9 1 Does the general sentencing statute trump the language of
the robbery statute by requiring a determinate sentence of months or
years? The supreme court said no.902 The court concluded that the
general sentencing statute was not intended to alter substantive
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criminal provisions, and that "judicial construction is required when
words construed literally would defeat the legislature's purpose.'

903. Id. See Worley v. State, 265 Ga. 251, 454 S.E.2d 461 (1995).

